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A GUIDE TO PENNSYLVANIA DELINQUENCY LAW
LEONARD PACKELt
I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

AND HISTORY

Introduction

THE LAW of delinquency

shares with the criminal law several common goals, among which are the prevention of antisocial conduct
and the protection of individual liberty. However, criminal law and
delinquency law have developed along different lines because of differing philosophical premises. While the criminal law seeks to prevent
antisocial conduct primarily through the punishment and treatment of
those who commit crime, it also attempts to preserve individual liberty
through the use of traditional substantive and procedural safeguards
such as the jury trial, the requirement of adequate notice, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right of confrontation of adverse witnesses, and the right to counsel. In contrast, the law of delinquency
disavows punishment and emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation as
the primary techniques for preventing juvenile crime. This alternative
focus of juvenile law has led to a reduction in the emphasis placed
upon the safeguards which are present in the criminal law.
There have always been members of the legal community, as well
as the general community, who have not entirely accepted the treatment
rationale of delinquency law. While some have disapproved of what
they view as the development of excessive leniency towards juveniles,
many others have objected to the absence of traditional safeguards in
the belief that the presence of these safeguards is necessary for the
protection of children.
Following a review of the historical development of delinquency
law in Pennsylvania, this article will analyze the Juvenile Act of 1972,1
the present law of delinquency in Pennsylvania.
t

Associate Professor, Villanova University School of Law. B.S., University

of Pennsylvania, 1957; J.D., Harvard University, 1960. The material in this article

was developed during the course of the Juvenile Justice Clinical Program at the
Villanova University School of Law.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
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History

Nineteenth Century Delinquency Law

In the 19th century, the need for a separate system for the handling
of delinquent children was first recognized. The result was the establishment of a separate group of institutions for the confinement of
children. Previously children were tried in the criminal courts and, if
convicted, they were confined in the same institutions as adults. Among
these institutions were jails, almshouses, work houses and poor houses.'
Confinement in the houses for the poor involved the same stigma as
confinement in jail. Some members of the community feared that subjecting children to confinement in institutions with adult offenders and
paupers could only lead to the criminalization and pauperization of the
children.3 The recognition of this danger and the steps taken to alleviate it marked the beginning of the law of delinquency.
The first step was the statutory creation in 1826 of the House of
Refuge in Philadelphia, an institution exclusively for children. 4 The
House of Refuge (Refuge) was a private association authorized to
provide a building and receive children who were adjudicated vagrants
or were convicted of criminal offenses, if in the opinion of the courts,
the minor judiciary, or the managers of poor houses, the children were
proper subjects for the Refuge. Committed children were to be wards
of the Refuge and could be retained until age 21, if male, and age 18,
if female. The managers of the Refuge were authorized to employ the
children or place them in apprenticeships. The purpose of this institution was to treat and rehabilitate the children, and to shield them
from the punishment and oppression which characterized the adult penal
institutions. 5

It was at this early stage that some of the principal characteristics
of modern delinquency law first emerged. Contemporary reports indicate that the lower courts committed children charged with crimes to
the Refuge instead of holding them for trial in the criminal courts. 6
2. See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
L. REv. 1187 (1970); Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing
Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CRIME AND DELINQ. 68
(1972); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.
STAN.

CAR. L. REv. 205 (1971).
3. See, e.g. Fox, supra note 2, at 1189; Rendlemen, supra note 2, at 213.
4. Act of March 23, 1826, ch. 5773, § 1, [1826) Pa. Laws 82. The Philadelphia
House of Refuge was later moved to Delaware County where it is now known as the
Glen Mills School. The first house of refuge was established in New York in 1825.
See Fox, supra note 2, at 1189-91.
5. Act of March 23, 1826, ch. 5773, § 1, [1826] Pa. Laws 82-3.
6. See 1 REPORTS OF THE PRISON
printed by Patterson-Smith 1972).
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While the courts' intentions may have been benevolent, the effect was
to deprive the committed children of their liberty without the procedural safeguards provided by a trial. However, since the criminal
courts of that era were often reluctant to convict and sentence children
anyway, the intentions may, in some cases, have been less than
benevolent.

7

In 1835, the type of conduct for which children could be committed was expanded to include incorrigibility." The challenge to this
amendment to the House of Refuge Act provided the first major test
of the developing law of delinquency. In Ex parte Crouse,' the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the constitutionality of
committing a child, without a jury trial, to the Refuge as an incorrigible.
The court held that a jury trial was not required for such a commitment to the Refuge, reasoning that a commitment of this type was not
punishment but was intended to benefit the child. The court declared
that it was saving the child from "a course which must have ended in
confirmed depravity," and that "not only [was] the restraint of her
person lawful, but it would [have been] an act of extreme cruelty to
release her from it."' This authority of the state to intervene and
confine a child for the child's own benefit was labeled "parens patriae".11
In 1893 the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a bill permitting the courts and minor judiciary to commit children not only
to the House of Refuge, but to any society incorporated for the protection or. placement of children.' 2 Almost immediately thereafter the
General Assembly passed another law which was a harbinger of future
developments in delinquency law. This latter act' s (1893 Act) forbade
the confinement of children under 16 in any cell or apartment with
adults charged with or convicted of a crime, directed that children
charged with crime receive a trial separate and apart from that of
adults, and required the creation of a separate docket for children's
cases. 4 The significance of the 1893 Act was that, unlike the earlier
legislation in which special treatment for children was discretionary,
confinement apart from adults and separate trials were mandated. The
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Act of April 10, 1835, No. 92, § 1, [1835] Pa. Laws 133.
4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
Id. at 11.
Id. (emphasis added). Crouse was the first delinquency case in this country in

which the phrase "parens patriae" was used. See Fox, supra note 2, at 1206;
Rendleman, supra note 2, at 218.
12. Act of June 8, 1893, No. 301, § 1, [1893] Pa. Laws, 399 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 27 (1965)).
13. Act of June 12, 1893, No. 328, §§ 1, 2, [1893] Pa. Laws 459 (repealed and
superseded 1933).
14. Id.
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1893 Act prompted a swift judicial response. Judge Yerkes of the
Bucks County Court found it unconstitutional because it classified
criminals by age and did not retain the previous trial by jury requirement.' 5 However, Judge Yerkes' opinion was not grounded in the
denial of rights to children, but rather upon the belief that such treatment was excessively lenient. He stated:
It is quite probable that this Act became a law through inadvertence. It represents humanitarianism gone mad, and is so
clumsily drawn that it is next to impossible to understand its clear
meaning. It appears, however, to contemplate the separation of
criminals of one class, as defined by the Act, from another class,
even where the necessities of the administration of justice require
their joint presence.
Some of the worst criminals known to the law are persons
under sixteen years of age. Frequently they are found in the
company of other criminals engaged in the perpetration of crimes
to the highest grade, often displaying a capacity for leadership and
a daring in advance of those in whose company they are caught.'"
2.

The Juvenile Court Acts

Despite this judicial setback, the legislative effort to aid troubled
juveniles continued. The next stage in the development of delinquency
law was marked by the legislative establishment of a separate judicial
system for delinquent children: the juvenile court.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed a Juvenile Court Act 7
(1901 Act) in 1901 granting exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving dependent or delinquent children to the lower court which are
now designated as the courts of common pleas. The phrase "delinquent
child" was defined to include any child under 16 years of age who
violated any state law or ordinance. The cases of delinquent children
were to be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of the 1901
Act rather than the criminal law applicable to adults.
Under the 1901 Act, the judges were to designate one or more
of their number to hear juvenile cases in a special courtroom with a
separate docket, and this court was to be called the juvenile court. The
1901 Act provided for a summary trial, although any interested person
could demand a jury trial. The court was directed to appoint a pro15. Courts for Trial of Infants, 3 Pa. Dist. 753 (Bucks County Ct. 1893).
16. Id at 754.
17. Act of May 21, 1901, No. 185, [1901] Pa. Laws 279 (repealed 1903). This Act
was virtually identical to the Juvenile Court Act which Illinois enacted in 1899.
Ilinois Juvenile Court Act § 1 et seq. [1899] Ill. Laws 131. The Illinois Juvenile
Court Act marked a new era in juvenile law. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
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bation officer and the Act permitted the juvenile court to place delinquent children on probation rather than committing them - a daring
innovation for that era. The provision of the 1893 Act which prohibited confining children with adults was retained in an amended
form,' 8 and the practice of making children wards of the receiving

institutions until majority was continued.' 9
It was not long before the 1901 Act was subjected to close judicial
scrutiny. Mansfield's Case"° involved an appeal by a 14-year-old boy
who had been committed by the juvenile court for burglary and larceny.
Those involved ,in the case viewed it as a major test of the 1901 Act.
Although the Superior Court could have reversed on technical grounds,
it considered virtually every aspect of ,the 1901 Act. 2' The most Significant portion of the opinion was that which reviewed the juvenile
court's delinquency jurisdiction. The court found that the 1901 Act
violated Pennsylvania's constitution because it granted special privileges and immunities, and that it potentially violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution in that it provided that persons under 16 years of age charged
with criminal offenses were to be ,treated differently than persons over
16.22 The Mansfield court was particularly concerned that a child violating an ordinance could be committed until that child reached majority
status while a person over 16 would receive only a small fine. In addition, the court found that the 1901 Act's provision for a summary trial,
unless a jury trial was demanded, violated the right to a jury trial.23
Despite this temporary setback, the forces behind the juvenile
court movement would not be denied; less -than 3 months after the
decision in Mansfield's Case the Juvenile Court Act of 1903 (1903
Act) was passed. 24 The 1903 Act was strikingly similar to the 1901
Act, making only two changes of significance. First, the juvenile court
no longer had exclusive jurisdiction over children charged with violations of the law, but rather the 1903 Act reverted'to the pattern set
by the House of Refuge Act: only those children deemed appropriate
for such disposition were to be referred to the juvenile court. The
second change was the elimination of the right to a jury trial.
18. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
19. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.

20. 22 Pa. Super. 224 (1903).
21. Id. at 228-35. The court could have reversed on the ground that the petition
filed with the juvenile court was not verified by affidavit as was required by the

1901 Act. Id. at 229.
22. Id. at 232-35.
23. Id.

24. Act of April 23, 1903, No. 205, [1903] Pa. Laws 274 (repealed and superseded 1933).
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The 1903 Act was promptly subjected to constitutional review in
Commonwealth v. Fisher.5 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
discussed the same issues that were considered in Mansfield's Case,
the court found the 1903 Act constitutional. The court held that the
1903 Act created no special privileges or immunities and did not violate
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.2 6 This
conclusion was premised on the finding that children tried as delinquents
were neither being tried for crimes nor punished, but rather were being
treated as objects for rehabilitation by the state, therefore, it was not
necessary to "'try" them in the precise manner used for adults charged
with -crimes. The court treated the jury trial issue in the same manner;
there was no need for a jury trial in a proceeding under the 1903 Act
because
[t] he act is not for the trial of a child charged with a crime, but
is mercifully to save it from such an ordeal, with the prison or
penitentiary in its wake, if the child's own good and the best in,terests of the state justify such salvation. Whether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no more a question for 2a7 jury
than whether the father, if able to save it, ought to save it.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle
that the doctrine of parens patriae must prevail over the traditional
procedural safeguards of the criminal law. It is not surprising that the
court relied heavily upon its earlier holding -in Ex parte Crouse.2"
However, it is unclear whether the determinative factor which favored
the 1903 Act was that the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over children charged with crime, but only jurisdiction in those
cases deemed appropriate. Notwithstanding this possible equivocality,
the Fisherdecision was widely cited by those active in the juvenile court
movement, and contributed greatly to the proliferation of juvenile courts
29
throughout the country.
3.

The Juvenile Court Era

Following the early struggle to establish its separate existence, the
juvenile court's powers were consolidated and supplemented by the
judiciary and the legislature. In 1908, the Philadelphia juvenile court
held that a magistrate could not discharge a child charged with delin25.
26.
27.
28.

213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
Id. at 50-57, 62 A. at 199-201.
Id. at 54, 62 A. at 200.
Id. at 55, 62 A. at 200-01.
29. See, e.g., Mack, The Juvenile Court,23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 109-10 (1909).
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quency, but was obligated to hold the child for the juvenile court.30
The same court ruled that its authority over a delinquent child placed
on probation did not terminate when the child reached 16, but continued until he-or she was 21, unless the court ordered the child to be
discharged earlier.3'
One year later, the 1903 Act was amended to permit the juvenile
court to amend, change, or extend its disposition of a child until the
child reached 21.82 In 1912, the Philadelphia juvenile court ruled that
institutions to which children were committed could only give paroles,
and not final discharges - the latter function solely being within the
power of the court.8" The effect of the decisions and legislation was to
make children who were on probation wards of the juvenile court.
Institutionalized children were still wards of the institutions, as they
had been in the 19th century delinquency legislation, but they were also
subject to court orders.
By 1923, the notion of a separate juvenile court had gained such
public acceptance that the 1903 Act was amended to grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the juvenile court over cases involving dependent,
neglected, or delinquent children. However, the juvenile court still
could certify cases to the criminal courts if the interests of the state
required prosecution. 84 Thus, Pennsylvania had returned to the law
of the 1901 Act, and Mansfield's Case8 was a dead letter.
New juvenile court legislation (1933 Act) was passed in 1933
which incorporated the provisions of and amendments to the 1903 Act
and some of the related judicial decisions.8 6 However, there was one
change of major significance: "Delinquent child" was defined to include not only children who violated state laws and local ordinances,
but also children who: 1) could not be controlled by their parents, due
to waywardness or habitual disobedience, 2) were habitual truants,
or 3) were children who habitually deported themselves so as to injure
or endanger their own morals or health, or the morals or health of
others.8 7 Additionally, in 1939, the age-limitation of children subject
30. Administration of the Juvenile Court, 17 Pa. Dist. 207 (Juv. Ct. 1908).
31. Juvenile Court No. 2725, 18 Pa. Dist. 79 (Juv. Ct. 1908).
32. Act of April 22, 1909, No. 73, § 8, [1909] Pa. Laws 119 (repealed and
superseded 1933).
33. Juvenile Court No. 7943, 21 Pa. Dist. 535 (Juv. Ct. 1912).
34. Act of June 28, 1923, No. 345, § 11, [1923] Pa. Laws 898 (repealed and
superseded 1933).
35. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
36. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433. The legislature enacted
a separate bill for Allegheny County which was virtually identical to the statewide law.
Act of June 3, 1933, No. 312, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449.
37. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433, at 1434 (repealed 1972).
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to the 1933 Act was raised from 16 to 18.8s The 1933 Act remained in
effect until -the passage of the Juvenile Act -of 1972.' 9
A simple review of the legislation and relevant case law fails to
illustrate fully what actually had occurred within the juvenile courts.
According to the advocates of the juvenile court system, the concept of
parens patriae fostered the development of a unique socialized court
aimed at individualized diagnosis and treatment, and in which traditional criminal safeguards were not permitted to interfere with the
benevolent goal of protecting and revitalizing the life of the delinquent
child.4 ° Although the procedures were not uniform among the states,
or in some cases even among the counties within a state, it appears that
the traditional substantive and procedural safeguards, including the
right to adequate notice, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, were not observed. It
was a common practice for the juvenile court to review a child's history
before making a finding on the facts, and there were no provisions for
right to counsel.

41

However, the intended benevolence and innovation of the juvenile
court was more than mere rhetoric. In the absence of statutory authority, there often developed pre-adjudicatory devices for diverting
children from the courts to social agencies which were better equipped
to handle the children's problems. Similarly, at the end of the proceedings -

the disposition -

there were creative programs designed

to utilize probation and therapy, and commitment to foster homes and
42
halfway houses rather than to institutions for the treatment of children.
These devices did not quiet those advocates of the traditional safeguards, and evidence of their activities appeared in Holmes Appeal.43
In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with a direct
attack upon the absence of these safeguards, specifically: the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to adequate notice, and the right
to confront witnesses. In upholding the 1933 Act, the court once again
adopted a parens patriae44 rationale, and this case constituted the
38. Act of June 15, 1939, No. 226, § 1, [1939] Pa. Laws 394 (repealed 1972).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
40. See Mennel, supra note 2, at 69.
41. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT- JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH

CRIME

28 (1967).
42. See text accompanying notes 171-73, 400, and 427-28 infra.
43. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
44. In addition to a brief examination of the development of juvenile law in
Pennsylvania, the court gave the following statement of the parens patriae rationale:
The proceedings in [a juvenile court] are not in the nature of a criminal trial
but constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose is not penal but
protective - aimed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around a child, just
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highest point of the development of this theory in Pennsylvania. In a
powerful dissent, Justice Musmanno observed that it was deceptive to
contend that an adjudication of delinquency involved no stigma or that
commitment to an industrial school was not punishment.4 He added:
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States guarantees all citizens of the United States due process of
law. No state law can abrogate this guarantee. It needs no citation
of authority to establish that, included within due process of law,
are the right to face one's accuser, to summon witnesses in one's
defense, the immunity of self-incrimination, and to employ counsel.
...[T]here is nothing in the Juvenile Court Act which deprives
minors of the constitutional safeguards above indicated. .

.

. If

'there is anything in the Juvenile Court Law which by fair interpretation sanctions ,this unconscionable thing, I must say that such
an un-American proposition is unconstitutional and I would,
therefore, declare it null and void.4 6

Justice Musmanno's dissent was an omen, as considerable pressure was
growing for a constitutional overhaul of particular procedures within
the juvenile court. This pressure culminated in a series of responses
from the United States Supreme Court.
4.

The United States Supreme Court and the Law of Delinquency
In re Gaut 4 7 was a typical juvenile case in which a child was

charged with making obscene phone calls. Notice to the child and his

family had been informal at best, and they had not been advised of
their right to counsel. The accusing witness had not been present and
the child apparently had been questioned by the juvenile court without
first being advised of his privilege to remain silent. On review, the
Supreme Court of the United States found that this procedure violated
the Constitution, holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required that the child be accorded adequate notice, the
right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, at least where commitment
starting, perhaps, on an evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the

strong arm of the State acting as parens patriae. The State is not seeking to

punish an offender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming one,
and to safeguard his adolescent life. Even though the child's delinquency may
result from the commission of a criminal act the State extends to such a child
the same care and training as to one merely neglected, destitute or physically
handicapped. No suggestion or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of
delinquency by a Juvenile Court.

Id. at 603-04, 109 A.2d at 525.
45. Id. at 611-12, 109 A.2d at 528-29 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).

46. Id. at 625-26, 109 A.2d at 535 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
47. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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to an institution was a possible consequence of the proceedings. 48
Parens patriae was no longer considered acceptable as the controlling
rationale for denying children fundamental safeguards accorded in the
criminal prosecutions of adults. The Court carefully indicated that it
was not compelling. states to adopt the complete panoply of safeguards
customary to criminal proceedings, and further indicated that its opinion
considered neither the pre-judicial nor the dispositional stage of a
juvenile case, but dealt only with the adjudicatory stage. 4 Further,
the Court specifically declined to rule on the right to a transcript and
appellate review, and noted that it was expressing no opinion on several
other issues which had been discussed by the court below. 50
In 1970 the United States Supreme Court ruled on the issue of
burden of proof in the case of In re Winship.51 The Court held that
where a child is subject to confinement for proscribed conduct, that
conduct must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.52
Finally, in 1971 the Supreme Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania" that a jury trial was not required in the adjudicative stage
of a juvenile proceeding.5 4 The Court was not willing to disregard
completely the notion of a benevolent procedure aimed at aiding the
child rather than punishing him. The parens patriaedoctrine was down,
but not yet counted out.
C.

The Juvenile Act of 1972

In the fall of 1967, the Pennsylvania General Assembly resolved:
[t]hat the Joint State Government Commission be directed to
study the recent Supreme Court decision concerning juvenile
courts [In re Gault] and to study our system so that the procedure
which will be applied in Pennsylvania will be in conformity with
the court's ruling. 55
48.
49.
50.
included

Id. at 31-57.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 58. The .issues upon which the Court declined to express an opinion
the applicability of constitutional standards to juvenile arrests, the admission

of hearsay evidence in juvenile hearings, and the correct burden of proof to be used in
juvenile hearings. Id.

51. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. Id. at 361-68.

53. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
54. The Court noted that the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings was fundamental fairness, citing the Gault and Winship decisions. The
Court reasoned that fundamental fairness involved primarily accurate factfinding
procedures, and concluded that a jury trial was not essential for accurate factfinding.
Id. at 543. The McKeiver decision was reached notwithstanding judicial notice
of the "disappointments, failures, and shortcomings" present in the juvenile court
procedure. Id. at 545-50.
55. PA. S. CON. RES. No. 132 (1967).
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In 1970 this Commission submitted the Proposed Juvenile Act 6 (Proposed Act) which generally adopted the structure of the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act (Uniform Act)." The Proposed Act was amended
and revised in the General Assembly, but retained the same essential
provisions when it was passed as the Juvenile Act of 197258 (1972 Act).
The remainder of this article is directed towards an analysis of the
1972 Act. At the outset, it should be noted that the three most significant changes made by the 1972 Act are: 1) it limits the delinquency
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts; 2) it codifies much of the preadjudicatory practice which had developed over the years in the absence of statutory authorization; and 3) it adopts many of the traditional safeguards discussed by the Supreme Court in the Gault case
while retaining the full spectrum of dispositional alternatives which
have characterized delinquency law. Although there is no reason to
believe that the 1972 Act will be the last chapter in the development of
Pennsylvania delinquency law, it is submitted that this Act, like its
predecessors, is responsive to the goals of the juvenile law as they are
perceived by the community at this time.
II.

JURISDICTION,

APPLICATION

FOR CRIMINAL

A.

OF THE ACT, TRANSFER

PROSECUTION,

AND

VENUE

Jurisdiction

The 1972 Act makes no provision for a separate juvenile court.
As a result, jurisdiction over juvenile matters lies with the courts of
common pleas, pursuant to article V, section 5 of the Pennsylvania
constitution. 9 Thus, while it is still customary to refer to the "Juvenile
Court," it must be recognized that the phrase does not refer to a
special court, but only to the court of common pleas when it is trying a
juvenile case.
56. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA JOINT
STATE GOVERNMENT CoMMIsSION, PROPOSED JUVENILE AcT (1970) [hereinafter cited
as PROPOSED AcT].

57. UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT.

58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
59. PA. CONST. art. V, § 5. Article V, section five grants the courts of common
pleas unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law. The schedule to article V provides that jurisdiction of juvenile matters
in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties is to be exercised by the family court
division of the court of common pleas. PA. CONST. art. V, schedule § 16(q) (ii),
§ 17(b) (ii).
There exists a tendency in the Pennsylvania courts to refer to "the jurisdiction"
of the juvenile court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pyle, .
Pa.... , 342 A.2d 101, 103
(1975) ; In re Gillen, .__ Pa. Super. __ 344 A.2d 706, 707 (1975). Since there are
no juvenile courts in Pennsylvania, but only courts of common pleas hearing juvenile
cases, it is technically inaccurate to refer to "the jurisdiction" of the juvenile courts.

It would be more accurate to refer to those cases to which the 1972 Act applies.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21: p. I

B. Application of the Act
The delinquency provisions of the 1972 Act most frequently apply
in two situations: 1) when a child has been charged with the commission of a delinquent act, and 2) when the transfer provisions of section
7 of the 1972 Act60 require the transfer of a child's case from a criminal
proceeding to a juvenile hearing. 6 A "child" is defined as a person
who -is: 1) under the age of 18, or 2) under the age of 21 and has
committed an act of delinquency before he reached 18.62 The following
subsections will explore the scope of the definition of a delinquent act
and the situations in which a section 7 transfer will apply.
1.

Delinquent Act
The 1972 Act defines a "delinquent act" as:
(i) an act designated a crime under .the law of this State,
or of another state if the act occurred in that state, or under
Federal law, or under local ordinances; or (ii) a specific act or acts
of habitual disobedience of the reasonable and lawful commands of
his parent, guardian or other custodian committed by a child who
is ungovernable. 'Delinquent act' shall not include the crime of
murder nor shall it include summary offenses unless the child
fails to pay a fine levied thereunder, in which event notice of such
fact shall be certified to the court.63

As the above definition indicates, a delinquent act includes both
acts of habitual disobedience by an ungovernable child and crimes.
a.

Crimes

A primary purpose of the 1972 Act is: "Consistent with the public
interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior .
,,.I
This is accomplished by including virtually all crimes within the definition of delinquent acts. The
inclusion of crimes committed in other states or under Federal law
ensures that children residing in Pennsylvania may receive the benefits
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Supp. 1975-76).
61. Juvenile Act of 1972 §§ 3, 3(1), 3(3), 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-103,

50-103(1), (3), -303 (Supp. 1975-76). Proceedings arising under section 3(2)
(involving the disposition and supervision of juveniles in conjunction witfi another
state) and section 3(4) (involving the "Interstate Compact on Juveniles") of the
1972 Act may also involve the Act's delinquency provisions, but because they are

rarely used, they do not merit a separate discussion in this article. See Id. §§ 3(2),
3(4) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-103(2), (4) (Supp. 1975-76).
62. Id. § 2(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(1) (Supp. 1975-76).
63. Id. § 2(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
64. Id. § l(b)(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101(b)(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
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of the 1972 Act rather than being subjected to a trial in another state
or in a federal court.
The exclusion of murder from the definition of a delinquent act
reflects a legislative judgment that such a charge is too serious to be
65
tried under the aegis of the 1972 Act.
Summary offenses are also excluded from the definition of delinquent act in the 1972 Act. 6 Pennsylvania appears to be the only state
in which summary offenses are not included within the meaning of
delinquent conduct, although the tendency in other states is to exclude
summary motor vehicle offenses from the operation of juvenile legislation.

7

The exemption of summary offenses is interesting both historically
and substantively. The early laws concerning delinquency in Pennsylvania were designed to remove juvenile offenders from the process of
the criminal justice system,"' thus preventing the confinement of children in jails with adult offenders, which would have resulted had they
been charged with, or convicted of, summary offenses in this earlier
period.

69

Since, as the author has observed, confinement pending trial and
imprisonment for conviction of summary offenses is relatively rare
today, this exclusion probably reflects a legislative decision that it
would serve little purpose to extend the protection of the 1972 Act
to these offenses when weighed against the burden which this large
number of cases might impose on the courts of common pleas.
Should a child charged with a summary offense fail to pay an
imposed fine, that child becomes subject to the 1972 Act, and the case
must be certified to a juvenile court.70 The Act is silent as to what
occurs subsequent to certification, although the language of the Act
seems to indicate that the summary offense then becomes a delinquent
act subject to trial in the juvenile court. However, the courts have not
considered certification in this manner; rather, they have treated such
65. But see text accompanying notes 89-100 infra.
66. See text accompanying note 63 supra. In Philadelphia, however, summary cases
are still being tried as juvenile cases. For a possible justification, see Klein, A
Practical Look at the New Juvenile Act, 12 DUQUESNE L. Rxv. 186, 198 (1973).
Summary offenses are tried before the minor judiciary and generally only
provide for a fine. Commitment is only involved when the offender fails to pay the fine.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6308(a) (1973), wherein the purchase of an alcoholic beverage by a person under the age of 21 is defined as a summary offense.
67. See, e.g., UNIFORM JUvENiLE COURT AcT, § 2(12), and the notes thereto.
68. See text accompanying notes 2-42 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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cases merely as hearings to determine whether there is any justification
for the failure to pay the fine.71
It appears that summary offenses must be tried initially by the
juvenile court where a single incident of crime gives rise to charges
which are misdemeanors or felonies as well as summary offenses. In
Commonwealth v. Campana,2 the Supreme Court of Pennyslvania
held that in an adult proceeding, summary charges must be tried in
common pleas court contemporaneously with felonies or misdemeanors
arising from the same transaction or episode. If the summary offenses
are tried first, a trial for the more serious charge is barred.13 It would
seem that this rationale applies to cases involving children and that,
therefore, summary offenses should be referred to the court which will
hear the more serious charges, the juvenile court.
b.

Ungovernability

The law of delinquency has, almost from its inception, included
noncriminal conduct within the definition of a delinquent act. 74 However, the class of noncriminal conduct which renders a child "ungovernable" is, for purposes of the 1972 Act, arguably more limited than it
has been in the past. For example, the 1933 Act7 5 defined delinquency
so as to include conduct such as waywardness, habitual disobedience,
truancy, and behavior in a manner injurious to or endangering the
morals, health, or general welfare of the juvenile or others.76

In con-

trast, the provision of the 1972 Act appears narrower, and, in practice,
is generally applied only to runaway children and promiscuous girls.
Although truants are classified by the 1972 Act as deprived rather than
delinquent,7 7 in certain circumstances truancy may still constitute a
delinquent act within the definition of the 1972 Act. Such a situation
arose in In re Garner,5 in which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
71. Some judges contend that this practice results in the court acting as a
glorified collection agency, particularly since most children are without resources, and
therefore are probably not subject to commitment for their failure to pay the fines.
For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of imprisoning an indigent unable
to pay a fine, see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) ; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970).
72. 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973).
73. 452 Pa. at 252-55, 304 A.2d at 441-42.
74. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
75. Act of June 3, 1933, No. 312, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972) ; Act
of June 2, 1933, No. 311, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972). There were two
Juvenile Court Acts, the later Act applying only to Allegheny County. They were
virtually identical and are treated as one act for the purposes of this article.
76. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, § 1, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
77. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 2(4) (v), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4) (v)
(Supp. 1975-76).
78. 230 Pa. Super. 476, 326 A.2d 581 (1974).
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a child's failure to obey
affirmed a finding of ungovernability based upon
79
school.
attend
to
command
her parent's lawful
Since the ungovernability provision of the 1972 Act is considerably more limited than past provisions, the 1972 Act is thereby less
vulnerable to constitutional attack on the grounds of vagueness 0 or
that it permits punishment premised upon a child's status."' Additionally, there are two features of the 1972 Act which tend to ameliorate
the harm that could arise from an overzealous attempt to enforce the
juvenile court's jurisdiction with respect to conduct which is essentially
noncriminal. First, section 8(a) of the Act 2 requires the probation
officer, or designated officer of the court to refer a child charged with
ungovernability to a private or public agency prior to a petition being
filed in juvenile court. Second, section 26 of 'the Act 8 appears to
prohibit the commitment of a child adjudged delinquent by reason of
ungovernability.8 4
2.

Section Seven Transfers

Since all crimes except murder and summary offenses are within
the 1972 Act's express definition of delinquent conduct, a child is likely
to be charged with a crime in an adult criminal proceeding only through
mistake or deceit on the part of the child. In anticipation of such a
possibility, the 1972 Act provided for its application to children
charged with crime.8 5 Section 7 of the Act provides in part:
If it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding other
than murder, that the defendant is a child, this act shall immediately become applicable, and the judge shall forthwith halt further
criminal proceedings, and, where appropriate, transfer the case to
the Family Court Division or to a judge of the court assigned to
conduct juvenile hearings .

. .

. If it appears to the court in a

criminal proceeding charging murder, that the defendant is a
child, the case may similarly be transferred and the provisions
of this act applied.""
79. Id. at 484, 326 A.2d at 585. In Garner the child was adjudicated both delinquent, because of her habitual disobedience, and deprived, because of her habitual
truancy. Id.
80. See Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Parens
Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973).
81. See e.g., Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

82. PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 11, § 50-304(a) (Supp. 1975-76).

83. Id. § 50-323 (Supp. 1975-76).

84. See text accompanying note 436 infra.
85. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 11, § 50-303 (Supp. 1975-76).

In Allegheny and

Philadelphia Counties there are separate family court divisions of the courts of common
pleas. In these two counties it is logical to have the case reassigned. However, in

most counties in Pennsylvania, the common pleas judge can hear both criminal and
juvenile cases, and there is no logical reason to reassign a case. Common sense
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Children sometimes lie about their age if they have a record in the
juvenile court. Can the court consider the deliberate misstatement of
age a waiver of rights under the Act or a request for transfer for
criminal prosecution under section 28(c) of the Act?8 While under
the 1933 Act a child was not entitled to postconviction relief if he or
she misstated his or her age, it is uncertain whether the same rule
would be followed under the 1972 Act.18 Obviously, counsel in a
criminal proceeding will have some difficult questions to resolve when
he learns that his client is a child. Will the client fare better in a
criminal trial or in a juvenile hearing? Which is likely to be more
severe, the criminal sentence or the juvenile disposition? Will the
child be harmed by admitting that he or she lied about his or her age?
Not the least of these are the ethical questions. Can the client's confidence be revealed - can his deceit be perpetuated?
While the 1972 Act's definition of delinquent conduct clearly
excludes murder,8 9 in practice the Act may be applicable to children
charged with this crime. Although a child charged with murder is
subject to the action of a grand jury and a criminal trial, section 7 of
the 1972 Act 9° gives the criminal court the authority to transfer the
action to the appropriate juvenile court for a hearing in accordance
with the provisions of the Act, rather than proceed with a criminal
trial. This provision of the 1972 Act codifies the prior Pennsylvania
procedure for children charged with murder. An example of this past
practice appears in Gaskins Case,91 where, after a preliminary hearing,
the county court in Philadelphia refused to certify the case to the court
of common pleas for a criminal trial, and itself adjudicated the child
delinquent. On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ordering the child be held for the action of a
would dictate that the common pleas judge merely treat the case as a juvenile case
by directing an immediate filing of a petition alleging delinquency, dismissing the
jury, if any, and disposing of the case as though it had been a juvenile proceeding
from the outset. Such treatment would be administratively sound at any stage of
the criminal proceedings. This procedure would have the advantage of obviating the
delay and confusion which results from a transfer of the case to another judge.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(c) (Supp. 1975-76). See also Klein, supra
note 66 at 203-04.
88. Commonwealth v. Harris, 223 Pa. Super. 11, 297 A.2d 154 (1972). Although the appellant in Harris was under 16 at the time of the offense, he told the
court that he was 19. The court denied his petition for postconviction relief, holding
that the 1933 Act did not deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction if the juvenile
was under the age of 16 at the time the alleged offense was committed. It was
determined that the 1933 Act only imposed a duty to transfer such proceedings to
the juvenile court if the defendant's true age was ascertained during the pendency
of the criminal charge. Id. at 11-12, 297 A.2d at 154.
89. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Supp. 1975-76).

91. 430 Pa. 298, 244 A.2d 662 (1968).
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grand jury and a criminal trial.9 2 However, the court also held that
the court of common pleas, sitting as the criminal court in this context,
had the power to transfer -the case back to the county court, sitting as
the juvenile court, if it was in the "best interests of both the child
and society that the criminal prosecution should not be pursued." 93
As a result, unless a murder case is transferred to a juvenile court,
the juvenile court serves only as a committing magistrate for a child
charged with murder: if a prima facie case is established, the child
must be held for the action of the grand jury and a criminal trial. 94
The 1972 Act does not establish the procedure or criteria to be
utilized by the court in determining whether a murder case should
be transferred for trial as a delinquent act. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania considered this serious deficiency in Commonwealth v.
Pyle,95 which involved a 17-year-old child charged with murder. A
rule to show cause why the case should not be transferred for hearing
under the 1972 Act was filed by counsel for the child. The lower court
held a hearing on this issue and discharged the rule to show cause
and the case, therefore, was conducted as a criminal case.96 On appeal
from the judgment of sentence the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
concluded that the lower court was correct in holding a hearing on
the issue of transfer.97 The court also affirmed the action of the lower
court in applying the criteria set out in section 28(a) of the 1972 Act
although those criteria are, on their face, applicable only in cases where
the ,transfer is to be from a judge hearing juvenile cases to a judge
hearing criminal cases. 98 In addition, the court held that the burden
is on the child charged with murder to demonstrate that he meets the
criteria necessary to justify the transfer of the murder case to a juvenile
court.

99

The question also arises as to the stage of the criminal proceedings
at which the criminal court may decide that a murder defendant is a
"child" subject to transfer of the case to a juvenile court. Under
section 7 of the 1972 Act this transfer may take place even after the
child's conviction of a crime less than murder.100 However, the more
important question remains as to whether a child's case may be transferred subsequent to his conviction for murder.
92. Id. at 310, 244 A.2d at 669.
93. Id.

94. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 28(e), PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit.

11, § 50-325(e) (Supp.

1975-76).

95 __ Pa. _
342 A.2d 101 (1975).
96. Id. at
, 342 A.2d at 103.
97. Id. at ., 342 A.2d at 105-06.
98. Id. at __, 342 A.2d at 104-05.

99. Id. at
, 342 A.2d at 106.
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-303 (Supp. 1975-76).
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Transfer for Criminal Prosecution

While the application of the 1972 Act is mandatory, some persons
who fall within the definition of a "delinquent child" may be excluded
from its operation in certain circumstances.' 0 ' Section 28(a) of the
Act 10 2 provides in part:

After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on
conduct which is designated a crime or public offense under the
laws, including local ordinances, of this state, the court before
hearing the petition on its merits may rule that this act is not
applicable and that the offense should be prosecuted, and transfer
the offense, where appropriate, to the trial or criminal division or
to a judge of the court assigned to conduct criminal proceedings,
for prosecution of the offense ....

103

This exclusionary process is called "transfer" under the Act, and section
28 provides both the procedure and10the
criteria to be used in determining
4
whether a case shall be transferred.
1.

Transfer Procedure
In Kent v. United States,105 the United States Supreme Court
established that procedural due process requirements must be met by
a court when it transfers a case from juvenile to criminal court. In
Kent, the Court considered the provisions of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court Act 106 concerning transfer of a child from juvenile to
criminal court.0 7 The child in Kent was transferred for a criminal
trial without a hearing. The Court held that such a transfer without a
hearing was not permitted "by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel,"' 08 and indicated that the question of jurisdiction was of great
significance to the child; potentially it meant the difference between
receiving a death sentence and being committed until the age of 21.
The drafters of the 1972 Act were cognizant of the procedural due
process requirements imposed by Kent, and accordingly drafted a pro101. This has been the procedure followed in Pennsylvania since the 1923 amendment to the 1903 Act. Act of June 28, 1923, No. 345, § 11, [1923] Pa. Laws 898
(repealed and superseded 1933). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50- 3 25(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
103. Id. The criteria required for transfer are discussed at notes 126-32 and
accompanying text infra.
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325 (Supp. 1975-76).
105. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In Kent, the defendant was 16 years old and was
arrested on charges of housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Id.
106. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 et seq. (1973).
107. 383 U.S. at 552-65.
108. Id. at 557.
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vision requiring a hearing for such a proceeding.'0 9 However, the
effectiveness of this hearing is neutralized by the 1972 Act's mandate
that written notice of the hearing and its purpose be given only 3 days
in advance." 0 It is submitted that this notice provision may run afoul
of the Kent due process requirements, since 3 days may not be sufficient
time to prepare for the complex issues that may arise in this type of

hearing.
In order to avoid any questions of double jeopardy, the Act requires that the transfer hearing be held prior to the hearing on the
merits."' In the transfer proceeding, the juvenile court may consider
probation and institutional reports," 2 which counsel has a right to
inspect. Counsel should handle the reports in the same manner that
13
he or she treats the reports at disposition."
The child may request transfer for trial under section 28(c) of
the Act, in which case the court may order that the Act not apply to
the child's case." 4 While the author has never heard of such a request
being made, it is difficult to imagine what criteria the court could use
to justify a denial of such a request." 5
Unlike its predecessor, the 1972 Act does not forbid the use, at
criminal trial, of statements made during the transfer hearing."
The
1933 Act had proscribed the use as evidence of "the disposition of a
child or any evidence given in a juvenile court . . . in any case or
109. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 28(a)(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a)(2)
(Supp. 1975-76). See UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT § 34, Commissioners' note.
110. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 28(a)(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a)(3)
(Supp. 1975-76).
111. Id. § 28(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
In Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975), the United States Supreme Court,
held that a prisoner who had been subjected to a juvenile court proceeding which
found that he had violated a criminal statute, but was unfit for treatment as a
juvenile, could not be subsequently prosecuted as an adult in a criminal trial. The
Court reasoned that this procedure violated the double jeopardy clause of the constitution since the defendant had been subjected to two trials for the same offense.
Id. at 1787.
112. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 28(a) (4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a) (4)
(Supp. 1975-76).
113. Id. § 37(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-334(2) (Supp. 1975-76). See also
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557-63 (1966). For a description of counsel's
handling of probation and institutional reports at disposition, see text accompanying
notes 366-75 infra.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(c) (Supp. 1975-76). It should be noted,
however, that such a request may be honored only when the specific criteria set forth
in section 28(a) are met. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text infra.
115. Section 28(d) of the Proposed Act provided that transfer upon request of
the child was mandatory. PROPOSED ACT § 28(d).
116. In contrast to the 1972 Act, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act prohibits the
use at a criminal trial of statements made by the child at the transfer hearing.
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 34(d).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

2 1: p. 1

proceeding in any other court.""n 7 While the corresponding section in
the present Act provides that "the disposition of a child under this act
may not be used against him in any proceeding in any court other
than at subsequent juvenile hearing,""" it does not forbid the use of
evidence adduced in the course of such disposition. This situation
presents a dilemma for counsel, as the child may be his own best witness
at the transfer hearing, especially if he or she is admitting guilt and
demonstrating contrition. However, without the exclusionary safeguard provided by the 1933 Act, the child's testimony may prove
harmful in the subsequent criminal trial.
The 1972 Act specifies no procedure to be followed after the court
makes a decision not to transfer. Due to this lack of guidelines, questions arise as to whether the court can immediately continue with the
adjudicatory hearing, or even whether the same judge may hear the
case on the merits in such a situation. It would appear that the judge
is obligated to withdraw upon request of counsel where prejudicial
information has been received which would be inadmissible during the
adjudicatory hearing.11 9
If transfer is ordered, counsel may be faced with several immediate
concerns. If the child is being detained, a request should be made to
the transferring judge to set bail, as presumably a child has the same
right to bail as an adult. In many cases, the court is willing to release
the child to his or her own recognizance or to the custody of his or
her parents.
The interests of the child also require consideration of the
remedies available to the court's transfer order because section 28(f)
of the Act 120 characterizes the transfer decision as interlocutory. This
characterization raises two questions, which are yet to be resolved:
first, whether the propriety of the transfer can be raised by application
or request for extraordinary relief from the court sitting to hear criminal cases,' 2 1 and second, if no such application is made to the court,
whether the right to raise the matter on appeal after conviction is
117. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, § 19, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433, 1441-42 (repealed

1972) (emphasis added).
118. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 27(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-324(b) (Supp.
1975-76).
119. Cf. Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975); Commonwealth v. Goodman,
454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652 (1973). In Goodman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that, upon request, a judge who had conducted a pretrial suppression hearing in a
narcotics case should disqualify himself from presiding at the subsequent trial when
the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing was highly inflammatory and not

germane to the indictment. Id. at 361-62, 311 A.2d at 654.
120.

PA. STAT.

121.

Cf. PA.

ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(f) (Supp. 1975-76).
CRIM. P. 323(j) which provides that a pretrial decision on the
suppression of evidence may not be reviewed by the trial court.

R.
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waived. 122 If the only remedy lies by appeal from a criminal conviction,
the remedy may not materialize until several years after the decision in
the juvenile hearing. The Commonwealth may have no recourse at all
if the court refuses to transfer, since the transfer is not appealable and
an appeal after a finding on the merits is probably barred by the double
jeopardy clause of the constitution. 2 '
Section 28(b) provides that a transfer terminates the applicability
of the Act. 124 It is unlikely that this section bars the judge hearing the
criminal case from making a section 7125 transfer of the case back to the
juvenile court, at least where the child is found not guilty of serious
criminal charges, but is determined to be guilty of only relatively minor
offenses.
2.

Criteria for Transfer

Under section 28 of the Act, a case is eligible for transfer to a
criminal court only if the child was at least 14 years of age at the time
of the alleged conduct.126 The conduct charged must be a criminal
offense, and the juvenile court must find that a prima facie case has
been established. 12 In addition, the court must find:
[T]here are reasonable grounds to believe that: (i) the child is
not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a
juvenile through available facilities, in determining this the court
may consider age, mental capacity, maturity, previous record and
probation or institutional reports; and (ii) ,the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill,
and (iii) the interests of the community require that the child be
placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one
which would carry28 a sentence of more than three years if committed as an adult.'

Subparts (i) and (iii) indicate that a child who has committed
serious crimes may be excluded from the benefits of the Act when
122. See Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A.2d 741 (1972), in which
the court noted the practice of Pennsylvania courts to hold issues not raised in the
court below as waived, so that they may not be raised upon appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 189, 296 A.2d at 741.
123. See Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973), which involved the placement of a 16-year-old boy with state juvenile authorities after he was adjudicated
delinquent following the commission of a rape. The court held that the state's subsequent attempt to bring the juvenile to trial on the same charge of rape violated the
double jeopardy clause. Id. at 225. See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
125. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-325(a) (1) (Supp. 1975-76).
127. Id. § 50-325(a), (a)(4).
128. Id. § 50-325(a) (4). It appears that the Commonwealth has the burden of
establishing that the transfer criteria have been met. See Commonwealth v. Pyle,
Pa. __, 342 A.2d 101, 106 n.12 (1975).
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there exists reason to believe there will be no positive response to
treatment and the child presents a danger to the community. Since
under the Act a child can be committed for up to 3 years to a state correctional institution,129 these criteria may constitute simply an indirect
device for permitting the juvenile court to transfer to criminal court
if the judge sitting in the juvenile court believes that the child should
be sentenced for longer than a three-year period. As a practical matter, however, children often receive lighter sentences for their first
criminal offense than they would receive if they were treated under the
Act, especially if the juvenile probation officer feels antagonistic as a
result of his past failures with the child.
Subpart (ii) of section 28(a) (4) reflects the disposition given the
defendant in Kent v. United States by the District of Columbia Circuit
upon remand from the United States Supreme Court.'8 0 The child in
Kent, a psychotic, was charged with three capital offenses. The District
of Columbia circuit held that the parens patriae philosophy of the Dis,trict of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act... required the juvenile court
to do what was best for the child's care and rehabilitation consistent
with providing for the adequate protection of the community.8 32 In
Kent, that approach required that the child be committed to a mental
hospital by the juvenile court rather than be transferred for criminal
trial. While the 1972 Act in section 28 adopts the Kent result, the
author has observed cases where transfers to criminal trials were made
without the undertaking of any psychiatric examination of the child.
D.

Venue

Generally, a criminal case must be tried in the county where the
offense occurred.'
Where delinquency is charged, the case may be
commenced in either the county where the alleged delinquent act occurred or the county of the child's residence.384 Since treatment is
generally the concern of the place of residence, the inclusion of the
county of residence for venue purposes indicates the parens patriae
foundation of the 1972 Act. Section 10 also furthers this principle by
permitting the transfer of a pending proceeding to the county of residence. ' 5 Such a change of venue prior to the adjudicatory hearing
129. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 25,
But see
130.
131.
132.
133.
(1972).
134.
135.

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322 (Supp. 1975-76).

text accompanying notes 443-48 infra.
401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 et seq. (1973).
401 F.2d at 411.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921
Juvenile Act of 1972 § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-306 (Supp. 1975-76),
Id. § 10, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-307 (Supp. 1975-76).
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might handicap either the Commonwealth or the child in the securing
of witnesses. This is apparently the reason why the Act only authorizes the change of venue "after the adjudicatory hearing."'3 6 However,
some courts are changing venue prior to the adjudicatory hearing despite the language of the Act., Usually such changes are consensual,
but in the absence of consent the court may lack authority to change
venue prior to adjudication.
III.
A.
1.

THE PREADJUDICATORY STAGE

Institution of Juvenile Cases

Arrest

Most juvenile proceedings originate with an arrest, although the
137
1972 Act does not speak of arrest as such. Section 11 of the Act
refers to "taking into custody", a euphemism designed to eliminate the
stigma associated with the term arrest.'
This phrasing is employed
despite the fact that section 11(2) of the Act'89 permits the child to
be taken into custody "[p]ursuant to the laws of arrest."'l 0 This
language operates to incorporate by reference the Pennsylvania criminal
laws of arrest, which are set forth in Rules 51 and 101 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 4 ' Under the Act, however, a
police officer's power to take a child into custody is not limited by
the laws of arrest. For example, a law enforcement officer or duly authorized officer of the court may take a child into custody "if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the child is suffering from illness or
injury or is in imminent danger from his surroundings, and that his removal is necessary...." 4 2 Also, custody may be taken of a child believed
to have run away from home,' 48 although there is no apparent authority
permitting a child to be taken into custody for other acts of ungovernability.
136. Id. § 10(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-307(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-308 (Supp. 1975-76).
138. The drafters of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act emphasized this point by
providing: "The taking of a child into custody is not an arrest, except for the purpose of determining its validity under the constitution of this state or of the United
States." UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT § 13(b).
This portion of the Uniform Act was not adopted by the drafters of the
Proposed Act because they felt it was "unnecessary under existing law." PROPOSED
AcT, supra note 56, § 11, Comment.
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-308(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
140. Id.
141. PA. R. CRIm. P. 51, 101.
142. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 11(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-308(3) (Supp.

1975-76).
143. Id. § 11(4),

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 11, § 50-308(4) (Supp. 1975-76).
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Institution of Cases Other Than by Arrest

Cases instituted by means other than arrest may arise in several
different ways. For example, a case may be instituted by the issuance
of a summons or warrant, the provisions for which are contained in
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 4 4 These rules, how14 5
ever, are not entirely consistent with the provisions of the 1972 Act.
For example, rule 102146 permits a summons or warrant to be issued
by an "issuing authority," which includes the minor judiciary, 47 while
section 18 of the 1972 Act 148 permits only the court of common pleas to

issue a summons or warrant. Therefore, it is arguable that members
of the minor judiciary may not issue a warrant in a situation involving
a juvenile. Rule 102 permits a summons or warrant to be issued only
after the filing of a complaint, and since there is no complaint in a
juvenile proceeding, a summons or warrant may be issued only after
a petition has been filed.' 49 Finally, the criteria set forth in section 18 (c)
of the Act' 50 for determining whether a summons or warrant shall
issue differ from the criteria provided in rule 102.151
144. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 102, 110-12.
145. Compare id. with Juvenile Act of 1972 § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 50-315 (Supp. 1975-76).
146. PA. R. CRIM. P. 102.
147. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 3(i) which defines "issuing authority" as "any public

official having the power and authority of an alderman, justice of the peace, magistrate
or district justice."
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315 (Supp. 1975-76).
149. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315, (Supp. 1975-76).
150. Id. § 18(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315(c) (Supp. 1975-76).
151. Section 18(c) of the 1972 Act permits a court to issue a warrant of arrest if
it appears from affidavit [sic] filed or from sworn testimony before the court
that the conduct, condition, or surroundings of the child are endangering his
health or welfare or those of others, or that he may abscond or be removed
from the jurisdiction of the court or will not be brought before the court notwithstanding the service of the summons ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315(c) (Supp. 1975-76).
Rule 102(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates
the issue of a warrant of arrest only in the following circumstances:
(1) the issuing authority has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant will not obey a summons; or
(2) the summons has been returned undelivered; or
(3) a summons has been served and disobeyed by a defendant; or
(4) the identity of the defendant is unknown; or
(5) the offense charged is punishable by a sentence to imprisonment of more
than three years.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 102(b).
In addition, rule 102(c) requires that a warrant of arrest be issued when "a defendant is charged with more than one offense and one of such offenses is punishable
by a sentence to imprisonment for more than three years . . ... " Id. 102(c).

Under both the 1972 Act and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
if the criteria for the issuance of a warrant of arrest are not met, then only a summons may be issued. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315
(Supp. 1975-76); PA. R. CRIM. P. 102.
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A juvenile case may also be informally initiated where the police
"invite" a child to come to the police station to discuss an offense
brought to their attention by a complainant. This method is not dealt
with by the 1972 Act or the general criminal law, and its use varies
from county to county in Pennsylvania as illustrated by the following
comparison. In Delaware County, use of this particular procedure is
relatively common. It is only after the child has refused the "invitation" or has come to the police station but the matter remains
unresolved by the police that a petition will be prepared and a summons
or warrant issued by the court. 15 2 In Philadelphia County, the police
will generally not "invite" a child to appear upon their receipt of a
complaint. Unless the charge constitutes a felony, in which case the
police may arrest the child, the police will usually refer the matter to
-the probation staff of the court who will invite the child to come in
for an intake hearing. 5 ' Here, as in Delaware County, a petition will
not be prepared and a summons or warrant will not usually be issued by
the court until after the child has declined the invitation to appear, or
the probation staff has tried and been unable to resolve the matter.
For the attorney handling a juvenile case, the manner by which
the case is instituted is significant in two respects: First, the circumstances surrounding the taking into custody are important in determining the admissibility of evidence and statements.' 5 Second, the
nature of the case's origin may also determine the role that the attorney
will play at the police adjustment stage and at intake."5 5
B.

Police Adjustment of Juvenile Cases and the Role of Counsel

One of the most significant characteristics of the juvenile justice
system is adjustment of cases by the police. Essentially, police adjustment can be defined as the disposition of a case by the police without
referral to the courts. While the police have a certain measure of discretion in charging adults, the discretion exercised in the adjustment
of juvenile cases far surpasses the discretion exercised in adult cases.""'
This practice reflects the belief that children can be inspired toward
reformation by the administration of a strong official warning and that
a certain amount of "horseplay" is an acceptable part of growing tip.
152. D. Ward, The Police and the Juvenile in Radnor Township, Delaware
County, Pennsylvania 49-61, 1971 (unpublished thesis in Villanova University School
of Law Institute of Correctional Law).
153. For a discussion of the intake hearing, see text accompanying notes 167-80
infra.

154. See text accompanying notes 247-318 infra.
155. See text accompanying notes 156-80 infra.
156. See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1966).
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One comprehensive study of this aspect of the juvenile justice system
was conducted in Allegheny County, 5 7 the results of which indicated a
substantial variation among municipalities in the number of juvenile
cases referred to the court by police. In one municipality, only 8.6
percent of the cases were referred to court, while in another municipality
71.2 percent of all cases were referred to court. 5 ' Nationwide statistics
indicate that adjustment occurs in 45 to 50 percent of all police contacts
with children. 5 9 Standard texts on police administration recognize and
condone the practice of police adjustment as a legitimate and useful
device in the administration of juvenile justice.160
Usually this stage of the process is relatively informal, involving
only an interview conducted by a juvenile aid division officer, or in
smaller police departments, the arresting officer, and attended by the
complainant, the child, the parents, and sometimes witnesses.
Little, if anything, has been written about the role of counsel in
station house adjustment. Few lawyers enter the picture at this stage
of a juvenile case, particularly when cases are instituted by arrest. This
would seem to -follow since few children have established a relationship
with counsel which would enable them to obtain representation at the
station house. When the child is invited to appear, it is more probable
that representation can be arranged.
It is essential for the attorney, in order to fully protect the child's
interests, to conduct a comprehensive interview prior to the appearance
at the station 'house. If possible, investigation of the facts should also
be made. It is further advisable to attempt to contact the victim of the
offense in advance, since there always exists the possibility that he or
she might prove to be cooperative or even receptive to an offer of
restitution.
Every effort should be made by counsel to ensure that the child
will present a neat appearance and a cooperative demeanor. Due to the
importance placed by the police on a good family relationship, the
parents, if available and willing to accompany 'the child, should be fully
prepared for the appearance.' 6 ' If restitution is a possible issue, it
should be explored with the parents and the child.
157. N.

GOLDMAN,

COURT APPEARANCE

THE DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR

(1963).

158. Id. at 86.
159. PRESIDENT'S
OF JUSTICE, TASK

(1967).
160. See E.

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 12

ELDEFONSO,

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS,
PURSUIT, POLICE WORK WITH JUVENILES
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 217 et seq. (4th ed. 1971).

261-301 (2d ed. 1973); J. KENNEY & D.

161. See generally Comment, The Attorney-Parent Relationship in the Juvenile
Court, 12 ST. Louis L.J. 603 (1968).
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In order to effectively represent a child at the station house, the
attorney should know as much as possible about both the official
guidelines 11 2 and the unofficial criteria which the police employ in
determining whether to adjust a case. One commentator has isolated
a number of factors which influence a police officer's decision to adjust
a case. 6 ' These factors include:
A. The policeman's attitudes toward the juvenile court.
B. The impact of special individual experiences in the court, or
with different racial groups, or with parents of offenders, or with
specific offenses, on an individual policeman.
C. Apprehension about criticism by the court.
D. Publicity given to certain offenses either in the neighborhood
or elsewhere may cause the police to feel that these are too "hot"
to handle unofficially and must be referred, to the court.
E. The necessity for maintaining respect for police authority in
the community.
G. Pressure by political

.groups

or. other. special interest groups.

H. The policeman's attitude toward specific offenses.
I. The police officer's impression of the family situation, the degree
of family interest in and control of the offender, and the reaction
of the parents to the problem of the child's offense.
J. The attitude and personality of the boy.
L. The degree of criminal, sophistication shown in the offense. 6 4
In some communities, the police adjustment stage of a juvenile
case may be somewhat more formal than the process outlined above.
Sometimes the procedure employed is very similar to a formal hearing,
162. A typical set of official guidelines would include the following criteria:
a. The seriousness of the offense.
b. Prior offenses and court contacts.
c. Willingness of parents and child to cooperate with community agencies.
d. Success or failure of prior referrals of child and parents to community
agencies.
e. Availability of community agencies for referral and, if such agencies are
available, whether or not services can be obtained only through probation or
court referral.

f. Admission or denial by the child.
g. Sufficiency of the evidence.
h. Desires of the complainant.
See E. ELDEFONSO, supra note 160, at 291-92.
163. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 157, at 129-31.
164. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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complete with the taking of testimony and the imposing of sanctions.
For example, the police might impose "probation" or a curfew, or
order restitution by the child. 6" However, the 1972 Act does not
authorize any of these devices, and counsel should be alert to the
possible abuse as well as advantage of this practice for the child-client.
Attempts at station house adjustment are not entirely free from
peril. Counsel should be cautious before permitting the child to waive
his fifth amendment rights. This is important if the attorney believes
that the police are more likely than not to refer the matter to court,
and particularly so in view of the possibility of a later adjustment at
intake. 6 ' Perhaps in most cases the most prudent practice is for the
attorney to instruct the parents and child to communicate with the
.police only through the attorney.
Finally, even if adjustment is not a likely possibility, the station
house presents a valuable opportunity for discovery which may not
present -itself again.
C.

Intake and the Role of Counsel

Intake is a procedure unique to the juvenile justice system. Structurally, it is a screening device used to separate cases requiring judicial
action from cases which may be handled in another manner. 1 67 In
Pennsylvania criminal procedure, as in most other states, the preliminary hearing and the grand jury act as screening devices in adult
prosecutions. Intake differs substantially from these devices both in
procedure and philosophy. First, intake is usually conducted by a
probation officer, not a judicial officer. 6 Second, the preliminary
hearing and the grand jury inquiry focus primarily on whether the
prosecution has established a prima facie case.' 6 9 At the intake proceedings the probation officer may not only screen out a case because a
prima facie case has not been established, but also because the probation
officer believes that the child need not go to court or that he or she can be
70
more profitably treated by another agency.1
Where a child is charged with ungovernability, section 8(a) of
the 1972 Act directs the probation officer, prior to the filing of a
petition, to refer the case to a public or private agency available for
165.
166.
167.
L. REv.
168.

See, e.g., Note, supranote 156, at 783-84.
See text accompanying notes 172-73 infra.
See generally Wallace & Brennan, Intake and the Family Court, 12 BUFFALO
442 (1963).
See Juvenile Act of 1972 § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304 (Supp.

1975-76).
169. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 141, 143.
170. See Juvenile Act of 1972 § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304 (Supp.

1975-76).
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assistance in the matter. 71' In addition, the probation officer may refer
the case when the charge of delinquency is based on criminal conduct.
172 If
This process is referred to as "informal adjustment" in the Act.
the probation officer informally adjusts a case, no petition will be filed,
and the adjudicatory stage will not be reached. While the language
of section 8 of the Act suggests that informal adjustment may take
place only if there is a referral to some social agency, many cases are
informally adjusted without such a referral. In these cases, the probation officer merely determines that filing a petition is not appropriate
173
or necessary, and the case is terminated.
Intake generally occurs within a day or two after arrest, and an
effort generally is made to have all interested parties present, including
the victim of the offense and the parents of the child. Often the police
officer involved in the case is not present, and in this situation the
intake officer relies upon a copy of the police report. The general guidelines and unofficial criteria which intake officers use in making their
determination may vary slightly from county to county, but they are
very similar to ,those guidelines utilized by the police in making their
determination with regard to adjustment. 74 However, the intake officer
is usually trained in, or oriented toward, the concepts of social work,
and as a result, is likely to be more responsive to a treatment-oriented
approach by counsel.
Representation at intake is far from universal and not all intake
officers relish the presence of counsel. While the use of traditional
criminal trial tactics may prove counterproductive to the child's cause, 75
an approach geared to the special character of the intake hearing can
prove to be an extremely valuable service for the client.Y'
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304(a)

(Supp. 1975-76).

172. Id.
173. In some counties the decision of the probation officer is treated as a recommendation to the court; however, it seems that this recommendation is followed in
a high percentage of cases.
174. See, e.g.,

JUVENILE COURT JUDGES' COMMISSION OF PENNSYLVANIA,

COURT HANDBOOK AND DIRECTORY

15-18 (1970).

JUVENILE

See also text accompanying notes

156-66 supra.

175. One commentator reported several cases in which the intake officer declined to
informally adjust cases because of "obstructionist" tactics by counsel. R. Lechowicz,

The Intake Interview, Purpose in General and Practice in Montgomery County,
24-33, Dec. 6, 1971 (unpublished thesis in Villanova Law School Institute of Correctional Law).
176. See Rosenheim and Skoler, The Lawyer's Role at Intake and Detention
Stages of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 CRIME AND DELINQ. 167 (1965); Comment, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Intake Processes, 13 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 69 (1968). The service which an attorney may provide his client at the intake
phase should not be underestimated. A recent comment stated:
If the attorney becomes involved at [the intake] stage, he can more
effectively determine the reactions of the court staff as well as gather valuable
evidentiary material and legal insight in order to better represent the client. Also,
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The child and the child's parents should be prepared for the proceeding in a manner similar to that used in briefing them for the police
interview.' 77 Since intake usually occurs a day or two after arrest,
there is usually a better opportunity for preparing and grooming the
child and the parents. However, there is one significant legal distinction
between intake and the police interview or interrogation. Section 8(d)
of the 1972 Act'7 8 provides:
An incriminating statement made by a participant [in the intake
process] to the person giving counsel or advice and in the discussions or conferences incident thereto shall not be used against
Objection in any criminal proceeding or hearing
the declarant over
1 79
under this act.

Thus, the child's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is protected at intake, though it is not at the police interview.
Despite this language in the Act, counsel should still exercise
caution. If the ch-ild makes an admission, the probation officer cannot
help but remember this fact, and it may tend to influence his or her
recommendation at the disposition stage, particularly if the child has
vigorously denied guilt at an adjudicatory hearing. It should also be
noted that the 1972 Act only prohibits the use of statements "against
the declarant."5 0 Thus, a statement by the parent, for example, that
there has been an admission to him or her by the child could possibly
be used against the child, and it is conceivable that the parent could be
called as a witness against the child. On balance, when there is a
realistic chance of adjustment, the child can be advised to speak about
the incident with considerably less risk than if he or she speaks at a
police station where there is no bar to the subsequent use of a statement.
Because the intake officer is concerned with treatment, the possibility of agency referral should' be considered by the attorney. This is
particularly relevant in drug abuse cases. In many communities, there
the mere presence of an attorney will prevent the court staff or policeman from
doing any act contrary to the welfare of the child. If the child is anxious to make
a spontaneous statement of admission or denial, the attorney can stop the flow

of his words and remind him of the consequences of his statement.
Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
177. See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
178. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304(d) (Supp. 1975-76).
179. Id. This language was taken from section 10(c) of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act. However, in enacting this provision, the following qualifying language
of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act was excluded: "except in a hearing on disposition
in a Juvenile court proceeding or in a criminal proceeding against him after conviction for the purpose of a presentence investigation." Compare UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 10(C) with Juvenile Court Act of 1972 § 8(d), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304(d) (Supp. 1975-76). This deletion indicates an intent to
make such statements inadmissible at any subsequent proceeding.
180. Juvenile Court Act of 1972 § 8(d), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304(d)
(Supp. 1975-76) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 179 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/1

30

Packel: A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law

1975-1976]

PENNSYLVANIA DELINQUENCY

LAW

are drug rehabilitation programs available, and if the child can avail
himself of them, the intake officer is likely to be cooperative. The same
consideration applies to available mental health programs or family
counseling. The chance for settling the matter by the payment of
restitution may also be explored at the intake proceeding, as well as
the possibility of changing the charge from delinquency to deprivation.
Finally, as is the case in the police station, the opportunity for discovery
should not be overlooked.
D. Detention
Juvenile detention presents a number of thorny legal, social and
practical problems. 8 ' The resolutioi of these problems will be aided
by viewing detention in four distinct stages: 1) from arrest until release or transfer to a detention facility; 2) from entry into detention
facility until the detention hearing; 3) detention hearing; and 4)
detention after the detention hearing.
1.

From Arrest Until Release or Transfer to a Detention Facility

Since there is no freedom to leave, a child is detained as a practical
matter from the moment he or she is arrested or taken into custody.
Section 13 (a) of the 1972 Act 1 82 provides:

A person taking a child into custody, with all reasonable speed
and without taking the child elsewhere, shall:
1) Notify the parent, guardian or other custodian of the
child's apprehension and his whereabouts;
2) Release the child to his parents, guardian, or other custodian upon their promise to bring the child before the court
when requested by the court, unless his detention or shelter
care is warranted or required under section 12; or
3) Bring the child before the court or deliver him to a detention or shelter care facility designated by the court or to a
medical facility if the child is believed to suffer from a serious
physical condition or illness which requires prompt treatment.
He shall promptly give written notice together with a statement of the reason for taking the child into custody, to a
parent, guardian, or other custodian and to the court. Any
temporary detention or questioning of the child necessary to
comply with this subsection shall conform to the procedures
and conditions prescr-ibed by this act and rules of court. 8"
181. See Ferster, Snethen, & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAm L. REV. 161 (1969); National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Juvenile Detention, 13 CRIME AND DELINQ. 11 (1967); Sumner,
Locking Them Up, 17 CRIME AND DELINQ. 168 (1971).
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
183. Id.
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If "taking into custody" has the same meaning as arrest, then the
Act is rarely adhered to. A child is not normally taken to his or her
home or to a detention or shelter care facility after apprehension, except
when the policeman does not intend to charge the child. Instead, the
child is normally taken "elsewhere" - to the police station.
At the station house, the police usually question the child to obtain
identification and to gather the information necessary to notify the
parent, guardian or custodian. This interrogation is authorized by
section 13 (a) (3).i"' The parents will be contacted, and police adjust-

ment may take place. 185 In most instances the matter is either adjusted
or the child is released to the parents with instructions to appear for
intake.
In some cases the child may be interrogated at the police station
concerning the facts of the alleged offense or subjected to identification
procedures. This practice does not appear to be authorized by the language of section 13.186 However, in the case of In re Anderson,'T the
sole reported case in which this situation was reviewed, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania explicitly held that under the 1972 Act children
may lawfully be taken to the station house rather than directly to a
detention facility when the attendant delay is not unreasonable, and
that evidence secured as a result of the interrogation of the child at the
station house is admissible at the adjudicatory hearing.'88
If counsel has the opportunity to appear at the station house, he
should explore the possibility of adjusting the case, assisting the child
in any interrogation, and representing the child with regard to identification procedures the police seek to use. If there is a possibility of the
police turning a child over to a detention or shelter care facility rather
than .to the parents, the 1972 Act provides:
A child taken into custody shall not be detained or placed in shelter
care prior to the hearing on the petition unless his detention or care
is required to protect the person or property of others or of the
child or because the child may abscond or be removed from the
jurisdiction of the court or because he has no parent, guardian, or
custodian or other person able to provide supervision and care for
184. Id.§ 50-310(a) (3).
185. See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
186. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310 (Supp. 1975-76). The drafters of
the Proposed Act did not believe the language of this section authorized any police
questioning beyond that necessary to satisfy the purposes of section 13. PROPOSED
AcT, supra note 52, § 13, Comment. This would seem to rule out interrogation
concerning the facts of the alleged offense.
187. 227 Pa. Super. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973).
188. Id. at 442, 313 A.2d at 261. The court in Anderson did not discuss the
drafters' intention of precluding interrogation by the police. See note 186 supra.
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him and return him to the court when required, or an order for his
detention or shelter care has been made by the court pursuant to
this act.18 9

Unlike the bail decision, several factors beyond the likelihood of
appearance at trial may be considered in the detention decision. The
above-quoted section clearly permits preventive detention, and the use
of detention as a form of pretrial punishment is not novel.19 °
The detention decision is not made by a judicial officer as is the
bail decision in a criminal case. The detention decision will be made
by a police officer alone or in consultation with the probation officer
attached to the detention facility. In Philadelphia County, the probation
personnel at the detention facility make the final determination as to
whether a child will be detained. In other counties, probation personnel
may not be available at all times, or they may normally defer to the
judgment of the police. Apart from those situations in which there
is no parent to whom the child can be released, or when the parents
refuse to take custody of the child, the decision to release or detain is
likely to be governed by factors similar to those set out in the section
on police adjustment, 1 1 and counsel, in his or her efforts toward adjustment, similarly can influence the detention decision.
2. From Entry into the DetentionFacility Until the Detention Hearing
Subsequent to being transferred to the detention or shelter care
facility, the child can still be released prior to appearance in court, as
the detention facility personnel are required by section 15(a) of the
Act 9

2

to release the child if it appears to them that detention is not

warranted.
Section 14 of the Act 193 designates the appropriate facilities for the
detention of children.'
Although adult facilities are disfavored, they
189. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 12, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-309 (Supp. 1975).
190. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 175, at 170. The authors

offer several examples of detention being used as punishment, including a study
undertaken in one Texas county which indicated that 39 percent of the juvenile
detainees were released after 3 or 4 days. One probation officer, submitting an
explanation of this recurring pattern, stated that, after these children spent a few
days in jail, they didn't need anything more in the way of service from the court.
Id. at 171, citing U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, A REPORT OF A FIVE DAY STUDY OF
SERVICES TO DELINQUENT CHILDREN IN TARRENT COUNTY, TEXAS, pt. 2, at 17 (1967).
191. See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-312(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
193. Id. § 50-311.
194. Id. Those facilities specifically approved by section 14 include licensed
foster homes, homes approved by the court, facilities operated "by a licensed child

welfare agency or one approved by the court," and other detention camps or homes
designed for the care of delinquent children which are approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. Id.
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are not expressly prohibited for periods of less than 5 days. 19 5 It is
unlikely that counsel will be able to affect the choice of facility since there
are usually only one or two facilities available.
I : The detention period can be utilized by counsel to locate absent
parents, to persuade parents to take custody of the child if they have
refused theretofore, to make other arrangements with family or friends
'to take custody of the child, and to marshal evidence for the detention
hearing.
3.

The DetentionHearing

A child held in detention must be promptly brought before a court to
determine whether further detention or shelter care is necessary. 196 This
hearing must take place no later than 72 hours after the child is placed
in detention. 197 In practice, the hearing is usually held the day after
arrest, except in situations where the weekend intervenes. The author
has been informed that in some counties a detention hearing is not held
unless counsel so requests,' 98 and this practice appears to contravene
the express language of the 1972 Act.' 99
The detention hearing can be a crucial stage in the proceedings
because it can affect more than simply the issue of detention. The detention hearing marks the district attorney's first appearance in the
proceedings and therefore the case may receive a final disposition, plea
bargains may be made, or a consent decree may be arranged.
The detention hearing can be analogized to a combination of a
preliminary arraignment and a preliminary hearing in adult criminal
proceedings, 20 although there is no authority in Pennsylvania requiring
probable cause to be established at the detention hearing.2"' In Philadelphia no witnesses are called, and the police report is read instead of
195. Id. See text accompanying notes 211-12 infra.
196. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 15(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-312(b)
1975-76).

(Supp.

197. Id.
198. This information was furnished to the author by several practicing attorneys
in Chester County, Pennsylvania.
199. The 1972 Act provides, in pertinent part:
An informal detention hearing shall be held promptly by the court or the
master and not later than seventy-two hours after he is placed in detention to
determine whether his detention or shelter care is required under section 12.
Juvenile Court Act of 1972 § 15(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-312(b) (Supp.
1975-76).
200. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 140, 141.
201. But see Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Baldwin v. Lewis,
300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
A prompt determination of probable cause is constitutionally required after arrest
on criminal charges, and this requirement is most likely applicable to juvenile
proceedings. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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taking live testimony. It is questionable, however, whether this procedure satisfies the requirement of an "informal detention hearing."20 2
The criteria affecting the detention decision resemble those discussed in other sections of this article, 20 3 but the author has observed
that often judges are reluctant to detain children who are attending
school regularly or who are steadily employed.
As previously noted, the 1972 Act permits both detention for the
protection of the child and preventive detention.20 4 It was unsettled
whether the former Pennsylvania statutory scheme authorized preventive detention, and although the language of the Act permits this
use, it remains to be seen whether the appellate courts will uphold preventive detention.

4.

20 5

Detention After the Detention Hearing
Should the court continue to detain the child after the detention

hearing, section 18(a) of the 1972 Act 20 6 provides for release if an

adjudicatory hearing is not held within 10 days after the filing of the
petition, the charging document in juvenile law. 20 7 However, section
15(a) of the Act2"' only requires that the petition be filed promptly.
A more logical provision would require that the adjudicatory hearing
be held not more than 10 days after the detention hearing, or no later
than 10 days after the child was placed in detention. The author has
observed that the courts have read the language of the Act as though
it contained one or the other of these suggestions. Although this provision for an expeditious hearing had been expected to cause serious
problems, such has not been the case.20 9 In practice, courts have extended the 10-day period when the hearing was delayed at the child's
request, and on occasion, the courts have refused to release the child
when the hearing was delayed at the request of the Commonwealth.
However such cases generally have become moot before the appellate
210
courts have had a chance to review them.

202. See Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971). See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975). Additionally, live testimony at the preliminary hearing is required in
Pennsylvania. PA. R. CRIM. P. 141. See also Commonwealth v Mullen, __ Pa.
333 A.2d 755 (1975).
203. See text accompanying notes 156-66 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 189-90 supra.
205. See Klein, supranote 66, at 193.
206. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
207. See text accompanying notes 230-41 infra.

208. Id. § 50-312(a).
209. See Klein, supra note 66, at 193-94.
210. See Commonwealth ex rel. Watson v. Montone, 227 Pa. Super. 541, 323

A.2d 763 (1974).
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The place at which the child is detained after the detention hearing
is regulated by section 14(a) of the Act,2 ' as is the place of detention
prior to the detention hearing. This provision appears to be a fertile
source of provocative litigation, as some counties provide no separate
facilities for children, or even where they do, some children may still
be housed with adults. Children considered to present a high risk of
escape or a threat to other children are sometimes confined in a county
jail rather than in a juvenile detention facility. In some of these instances, counsel have successfully convinced the court in habeas corpus
proceedings to transfer the child to the juvenile detention facility.212
If detention extends beyond the adjudicatory hearing or if for some
reason the adjudicatory hearing is delayed, counsel should be alert to
the possibility of a change in circumstances in the home or elsewhere
which might persuade the court to release the child. The 1972 Act does
not provide specifically for such a contingency except where the parent
does not appear or waives appearance at the detention hearing,213 but
there is no reason why the court could not reconsider the need for
detention.
The longest delays often occur while a social study214 is being
prepared subsequent to adjudication. While the Act requires that
priority be given to those cases in which the child is in detention, 215
there still may be a substantial delay between the court's order of placement in a juvenile institution and the moment at which the child is
actually placed in the institution. Many juvenile courts permit the
child to be released from detention pending the social study or placement, if counsel can present justification.
IV.

THE ADJUDICATORY STAGE

A. Counsel
The Supreme Court of the United States in In re Gault2 6 established that counsel is constitutionally required in a juvenile case where
there exists a possibility of commitment. 17 In accordance with this
requirement, section 20 of the 1972 Act provides that
a party is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages
of any proceedings under this act and if he is without financial
211.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
212. Unfortunately, there are at present no reported cases in this area. The
information was provided to the author by a number of attorneys within Montgomery,
Delaware and Chester Counties.
213. Juvenile Act of 1972, § 15(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-312(c) (Supp.
1975-76).
214. See text accompanying notes 366-75 infra.
215. Id. § 23(e), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-320(e) (Supp. 1975-76).

216. 387 U.S.1 (1967).
217. Id. at 41.
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resources or otherwise unable
to employ counsel, to have the court
218
provide counsel for him.

Since under the Act proceedings are commenced by the filing of the
petition,219 one might conclude that the right to counsel does not arise
until the petition has been filed. However, it is clear that a child has
a constitutionally mandated right to counsel at a custodial interrogation,22 0 a lineup, 2 2' and possibly at intake. Since intake generally takes
place prior to the filing of a petition, the right to counsel would not
attach under the Act, and in practice, counsel is not generally provided
at intake. 2 In Coleman v. Alabama,223 the United States Supreme
Court held that counsel was constitutionally required at a preliminary
hearing in a criminal case since it was deemed a "critical" stage of the
proceedings. 2 4 The Court reasoned that counsel, if present, might be
able to prevent an improper or erroneous prosecution. 5 It can be
argued that intake in a juvenile case is also a critical stage since at this
proceeding counsel can similarly prevent the case from reaching the
adjudicatory stage.2 6 In a case appropriate for informal adjustment,
but which has slipped through intake, it would be worthwhile for counsel
to discuss with the district attorney or the court the possibility of referral back to intake.
The experience of the author has indicated that Pennsylvania
courts are reluctant to find a waiver of the right to counsel at any
hearing under the 1972 Act. It has been suggested that this sound
policy be extended so that neither the child nor the parents be permitted
to waive the child's right to counsel.2 2 7 In some instances, nonindigent
parents of the child may hesitate to retain counsel for a variety of
reasons.22 1 In such situations, if the court is persuaded that a conflict
exists between the parent and child, or that the parents' refusal to pro218. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-317 (Supp. 1975-76).
219. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 6(3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-302(3) (Supp.
1975-76).
220. See text accompanying notes 251-300 infra.
221. See text accompanying notes 312-18 infra.
222. Delaware County is an exception. Under the unusual intake procedure in
that county, the petition is filed prior to intake, and counsel is, therefore, required and
provided.
223. 399 U.S.1 (1970).
224. Id. at 9-10.
225. Id. at 9.
226. See Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, Another Look at the Role of Due Process in
Juvenile Court, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 233, 244 (1972).
227. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE FOR DRAFrING FA~m.y AND JUVENILE COURT AcTs § 25(a) (1969).
228. For example, the parent may be hostile to the child's interest, or he may feel
that an attorney will disturb his relationship with the child.
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vide counsel renders the child an "indigent," section 20 of the Act
requires the appointment of counsel.2 29
B.

The Petition and Notice

The notice provisions are probably the weakest aspect of the 1972
Act. In Gault, the United States Supreme Court held that "[n]otice,
to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in
advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity
to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set forth the alleged misconduct
with particularity'.

2 30

The notice provisions of the 1972 Act do not

adequately comply with the Gault due process standard. Section 18,
which contains the notice provisions, establishes neither a time for
service of a summons nor the time to elapse between service of a summons and a hearing.2 31 However, in view of the due process notice
requirement of Gault, it is extremely unlikely that the courts will affirm
an adjudication of delinquency if counsel can establish that he has not
had adequate time from receipt of the notice of hearing to prepare his
case.
The 1972 Act also fails to provide adequately for the content of
the notice in ;that it does not require the petition, which is the charging
document, to set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. Section
17 of the Act requires only that the petition plainly set forth, "[t]he
facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court and this
act."

2 32

Two basic purposes are served by the requirement that the alleged
misconduct be set forth with particularity: first, to advise counsel of
the offense charged so that a satisfactory defense may be prepared;
and, second, to adequately state the crime charged so that the juvenile
court will be able to ascertain whether it has the requisite jurisdiction.3 '
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code23 4 establishes gradations of offenses,
and as a result, the same act may constitute a felony, misdemeanor, or
summary offense depending on such facts as the value of the stolen
§ 50-317 (Supp. 1975-76).
230. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967), quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
MENT

AND

SOCIETY

ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE,

THE

CHALLENGE OF

ON LAW ENFORCECRIME

IN

A

FREE

87 (1967).

231. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-315 (Supp. 1975-76). It should be noted,
however, that section 28(a) (3) of the Act requires that notice must be given 3 days
in advance of a transfer hearing. Id. § 50-325(a) (3).
232. Id. § 50-314.
233. There are other purposes for the "particularity" requirement, such as
ensuring that the crime being tried is the same crime charged by the grand jury,
preventing a subsequent trial for the same offense, and providing an appellate court
with a sufficiently definite set of facts against which to measure the proof. See
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
234. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 101 et seq. (1973).
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23
item23 5 or the amount of damage done. 0 Thus, in some cases if the
elements of the alleged offense are not carefully set out and a citation
provided, counsel will not be able to prepare a defense and the court
will be unable to determine whether the 1972 Act is applicable since
23 7
The notice
the Act is not normally applicable to summary offenses.
provisions of the Act do not guarantee that either of these two purposes
of the particularity requirement will be satisfied, and in practice, many
petitions appear to be defective. It would be helpful if the petitions
would conform to the following requirements for indictments or informations, as set out in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure:

1) The date of the offense;
2) A plain concise statement of the essential
elements of the offense;
3) Official or customary citation of the statute
and section which the defendant is alleged to
23 s
have violated.
The 1972 Act also fails to provide a procedure by which a faulty
petition may be attacked, but it would appear that the appropriate formal
technique would be an application to quash the petition. 23 9 In many
cases, the district attorney would probably be willing to amend the
petition upon an informal request. If the defect is not raised until the
time of the hearing, it is likely that the court in most cases would follow
rule 220 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and permit
amendment, provided that the petition as amended does not charge an
additional or different offense.2 4 ° If amendment is permitted, a continuance should be granted in the event of any element of surprise or
241
injustice to the child.
C.

Discovery

The potential for informal discovery at the station house and at
intake has been discussed previously. 24 2 An opportunity for discovery
235. Id.§ 3903 (1973).
236. Id. § 3304. See In re Gillen, _ -- Pa. Super. _, 344 A.2d 706 (1975), in which
the Commonwealth's failure to adequately prove the requisite amount of damages
required the reversal of a finding of delinquency. 344 A.2d at 708.
237. See Juvenile Act of 1972 § 2(2), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2)
(Supp. 1975-76). See also text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
238. PA. R. CRIM. P. 213, 225.
239. See id. 304.
.240. See id. 220.
241. Commonwealth v. Coles, 226 Pa. Super. 488, 313 A.2d 329 (1974) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Brown, 94 Dauph. 443 (C.P. 1972).
242. See text accompanying notes 166 and 180 supra. ' .
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may be lost where counsel is not available to the child prior to the filing
of the petition; however, this loss may not be detrimental since often
the police and witnesses will speak to counsel or an investigator and
advantage can be taken of these opportunities after all.243 It is the
author's experience that in juvenile cases the district attorney's office
is usually willing to grant informal discovery of the information in its
possession. Most district attorneys recognize, quite correctly, that,
because of the different theoretical basis of the juvenile law, their prosecutorial role in the juvenile area differs from their role in the adult
criminal area.
Parenthetically, discovery can also be a collateral goal of plea negotiations or requests for a more specific petition.
The 1972 Act provides no formal discovery procedure. Under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, a criminal defendant may only have a copy of his written confession or statement,
and no other discovery may be ordered except upon proof by the defendant "of exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons.

' 244

It

remains to be seen whether the courts will apply these rules to juvenile
cases.
Section 38 of the Act provides that inspection of law enforcement
records and files concerning a child is permitted by "[c]ounsel for a
party to the proceeding. '245 Although there are no cases interpreting
this provision, it is possible that the courts will apply this more liberal
standard of discovery rather than the stricter test of the criminal rules.
It is important to note that probation reports, and court files and
records are available to counsel in transfer proceedings and disposition
24 6

hearings.

D.

Suppression of Evidence

The 1972 Act does not expressly provide for suppression hearings,
as do the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,247 which results
in a substantial procedural variation among the counties in Pennsylvania
as to the format and scope of this type of proceeding in juvenile cases.
In Philadelphia County, it is customary for counsel to file written
motions to suppress evidence. In Delaware County, the district attorney
does not insist on a written motion, but prefers to be notified in advance
of the adjudicatory hearing that such a motion will be made. The
243. See generally A.

AMSTERDAM,

THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 91

B. SEGAL & M.

MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR

et seq. (1967).

244. PA. R. CRIM. P. 310.
245. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

§ 50-335(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
246. Juvenile Act of 1972 §§ 23(d), 37, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-320(d),
334 (Supp. 1975-76).

247. PA. R. CRM. P. 323, 324.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/1

40

Packel: A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law

1975-19761

PENNSYLVANIA

DELINQUENCY LAW

Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently held that it is not necessary
to file a pretrial motion to suppress evidence in a juvenile case.248
In most counties a motion to suppress is heard immediately prior to
the adjudicatory hearing. If the evidence ultimately is suppressed, there
is the possibility that the judge might be prejudiced by having heard
the evidence. In such a case, counsel should request that the adjudicatory hearing be transferred to another judge.
With regard to the evidence which may be suppressible, section
21 (b) of the Act provides:
An extrajudicial statement, if obtained in 'the course of violation
of this act or which could be constitutionally ,inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding, shall not be used against him. Evidence illegally seized or obtained shall not be received
over objection to
24 9
establish the allegations made against him.

This suppressible evidence will be discussed under three headings:
confessions, 250 evidence illegally seized or obtained, and identification
evidence.
1.

Confessions

The admissibility of confessions is a constantly recurring issue in
the criminal law. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Miranda
v. Arizona,251 established that an adult's confession will only be admissible if he was warned of his right to remain silent, that anything
said may be used against him, that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be
appointed prior to questioning if so desired. 252 In order for a waiver of
these rights to be effective under Miranda, the waiver must have been
253
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
The Miranda standard applies to juvenile cases 254 and section
21(b) of -the Act recognizes this by barring confessions "which could
be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. 255
Except for the Miranda standard, the admissibility of children's
confessions is currently an extremely unclear area of the law in Pennsylvania. Almost all of the case law in this area has involved homicides,
and there has only been one reported juvenile appellate case dealing
248. In re Stoutzenberger, ___ Pa. Super. -,
344 A.2d 668, 670 n.2 (1975).
249. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Supp. 1975-,76).
250. The term "confessions", as used in this article, represents the general
category of extra-judicial statements.
251. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
252. Id. at 472.
253. Id. at 444.
254. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
255. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 50-318(b) (Supp: 1975-76).
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with facts which occurred after the 1972 Act was enacted. 256 Therefore,
the following discussion can only suggest the outlines of the law dealing
with the admissibility: of children's confessions.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the voluntariness
of a child's confession cannot be judged by the more exacting standards
of maturity, 257 and that the circumstances attending the confession must
be scrutinized with special care.26 This approach has been labeled the
'
"totality of the circumstances test,"259
and' aside from the indication of
greater leniency toward children, it does not differ significantly from the
test applied to adults.
Logically, one factor should be of greater significance than others
in viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding a child's confession - the presence of the parents to assist the child in the interrogation. However, in several cases where children were interrogated
without their parents, and in one case where the parent was denied
permission to participate in the interrogation, the confessions were held
admissible by Pennsylvania courts. 6 ° On the other hand, in three
recent cases some members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have
placed great emphasis on the role of the parent. In Commonwealth v.
Jones,201 the conviction of a 15-year-old boy was reversed.

The ma-

jority opinion, with four concurring opinions, stressed the father's
absence from the interrogation room as a factor in determining that
the totality of the circumstances did not support a conclusion that the
confession was voluntary. 26 2 In Commonwealth v. Roane,263 the conviction of a 16-year-old boy was reversed. The boy's mother was initially denied admission to the interrogation room but when she gained
access thereto, the Miranda Warnings were given and although she tried
to dissuade her son from confessing, he gave a statement in her presence. The court by a four to three margin held the confession inadmissible.2 64 Three members of the court joined in the opinion which
256. Anderson Appeal, 227 Pa. Super. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973).
257. See Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 48, 271 A.2d 257, 260 (1970).
258. See Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 354, 287 A.2d 131, 133 (1971).
259. Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 558, 296 A.2d 755, 759 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 356, 287 A.2d 131, 134 (1971) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
260. Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 255 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 296 A.2d 823 (1972) ; Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153,
295 A.2d 311 (1972) (parent denied permission to participate in interrogation);
Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970) ; Anderson Appeal, 227 Pa. Super. 439, 313
A.2d 260 (1973).
261 .......Pa .....
,328 A.2d 828 (1974).

262. Id. at ----328 A.2d at 831.
263.
Pa... 329 A.2d 286 (1974).
264. Id. at .__ 329 A,2d at 289.
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stated that the Commonwealth has a heavy burden to meet in establishing voluntariness when a parent refuses to consent to a child's confession. 26 5 The court held that the burden was not met since the mother
had not been given an opportunity to discuss the matter privately with
her son.266 In Commonwealth v. Starke, 26 7 the confession of a 14-

year-old was held inadmissible although the child's mother met with
him privately and encouraged him to make a true statement. The
opinion, representing the view of only three members of -the court, stated
that the confession could not be deemed voluntary since the mother was
not informed of the child's Mirandarights.265
This seeming inconsistency in the decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court may be partially explained by the slightly differing
circumstances involved in each case. However, this inconsistency is
inherent in a subjective standard based on the "totality of the circumstances." Some of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices have indicated that 'they would prefer a more objective standard be adopted to
test the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession. Justice Roberts has
taken the position that no confession of a 16-year-old is voluntary unless
there was adult guidance.269 Justices Nix and Manderino have agreed
with Justice Robert's view, at least for a child of 14 years of age. 270 This
objective standard had never received the support of a majority of the
court until it decided Commonwealth v. McCutchen,27 ' the most recent
reported case on this issue. In McCutchen, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held the confession of a 15-year-old boy inadmissible because it
was given in the absence of his parent.2 72 It remains to be seen whether
McCutchen will establish a rule that confessions of 15-year-olds are
inadmissible per se if a parent is not present, and if so, whether the
rule will be applied to children older than 15.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further indicated that
Miranda warnings and voluntariness are not 'the sole determinants of
the admissibility of a confession. In Commonwealth v. Tingle,27 the

court held the confession of an adult inadmissible because it resulted
from a delay of 21 hours in bringing the defendant to a preliminary
265. Id. at

_ 329 A.2d at 288.

266. Id. at
_, 329 A.2d at 289.
267. - Pa. _, 335 A.2d 698 (1975).
268. Id. at -,
335 A.2d at 703. See Commonwealth v. Webster, __ Pa.
A.2d (1975).

-,

269. Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 265, 366, 287 A.2d 131 139 (1971)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).

270. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 356, 296 A.2d 823, 828 (1972)
(Nix, Roberts, & Manderino, JJ., dissenting).
271. __ Pa. _, 343 A.2d 669 (1975).
272. Id. at -,
343 A.2d at 670.

273. 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
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arraignment. This conclusion was not predicated upon a violation of
constitutional standards, but rather upon a violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure" 4 which require that a defendant
be brought before an issuing authority without unreasonable delay.27 '
This standard necessitates a judicial definition of "unreasonable delay"
and the determination of whether the confession "resulted from" the
unreasonable delay.

In Commonwealth v. Johnson,2 76 a divided Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a delay of 3 hours and 25 minutes between arrest and
confession was unreasonable. 77 The court determined that even this
short delay was improper since, in the absence of any justification for
the delay being offered by the prosecution, it must be concluded that the
delay had been designed to obtain the confession. The court emphasized
that the defendant had initially denied involvement in the crime; had
he cooperated initially, the court indicated that it might have considered
the delay reasonable.27 8 In fact, the same court less than 2 months later,
in Commonwealth v. Michael Wilson, 279 held a confession given 4

hours after an arrest admissible, the delay being justified by an oral
20
inculpatory statement given shortly after the arrest.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Grant
Wilson,2 s ' stated that a confession will be deemed to "result from" the
unreasonable delay unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. 22
In Grant Wilson, the fact that a child's mother urged him to make a
statement was held not sufficient to rebut the inference that the confession resulted from the delay. 2 8 But in Michael Wilson the confession was deemed not to result from the delay since there was originally an inculpatory statement.28 4
Still another factor which has been considered in determining the
admissibility of a child's confession is the legality of the arrest. In
the recent case, Commonwealth v. Jackson,8 5 the Pennsylvania Su274.

Id. at

246, 301 A.2d at 703.

275. PA. R. CRIM. P.62, 130.

276 .......
Pa.
327 A.2d 618 (1974).
277. Id. at __ 327 A.2d at 619.
278. Id.
279.
Pa. _, 329 A.2d 881 (1974).
280. Id. at _, 329 A.2d at 886.
281. __ Pa. _, 327 A.2d 621 (1974).
282. Id. at _, 327 A.2d at 622. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, - Pa. _
327 A.2d 618 (1974). But see Commonwealth v. Whitson, __ Pa. _, 344 A.2d 653
(1975) ; Commonwealth v. Bryant, ___ Pa __ 334 A.2d 603 (1975) ; Commonwealth
v. Hamilton, ___ Pa.
, 334 A.2d 588 (1975); Commonwealth v. Young,
- Pa.
-, 334 A.2d 252 (1975).
283.
Pa. at __, 327 A.2d at 622.
284. -- Pa. _,329 A.2d at 885-86.
285. - Pa. , 331 A.2d 189 (1974).
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preme Court held that a confession would be suppressed if it was the
"fruit" of an arrest based on less than probable cause. In ascertaining
whether a confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, ,the court indicated
that the Commonwealth would have to prove that the confession was
caused by something so unrelated to the initial illegal arrest that it
286
could not reasonably be said to have been derived from that arrest.
It is uncertain what would serve as a sufficiently unrelated cause. The
possibilities include: a second valid arrest or grounds for one ;287 a
confrontation with an accomplice who implicates the defendant ;218 or
289
the defendant's sense of remorse.

It also remains to be seen whether the 1972 Act, and particularly
the language in section 21(b) of the Act, which denies admissibility
'290
to confessions "obtained in the course of a violation of this act,"
will have any impact. Thus far, there has been only one case decided
under the Act to serve as a guide: Anderson Appeal.291 In Anderson,
the child was taken to a police station at 9:00 p.m. as a suspect in a
shooting. At the station, he was given the Miranda warnings and was
questioned for about 15 minutes until 10:00 p.m., at which time he
confessed. Unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the child's
mother during this period.2 9 2 At about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. he signed
a typed copy of his statement and was taken to a detention facility. The
court held the confession admissible, concluding that the 22 hour
delay in taking the child to the detention facility was not an "unreasonable delay.

'293

The court implicitly condoned the interrogation of a

child, and failed to discuss the parents' absence. 294 Additionally, the
superior court favorably cited the following language of the lower
court:
It is readily acknowledged by this court that any confession
or other incriminating statement that is not obtained in conform286. Id. at _, 331 A.2d at 192 n.6, citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney,
348 F.2d 22, 29 (3d Cir. 1965). In In re Stoutzenberger, __ Pa. Super. -,
344

A.2d 668 (1975), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania applied the Jackson rule to a
juvenile case. 344 A.2d at 671.
287. Id. at _ 331 A.2d at 192 n.5.
288. Commonwealth v. Wright, __ Pa.
,
A.2d (1975) reported in 16
CRIM. L. RrRa. 2425 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 1975).
289. Commonwealth v. Davis, __ Pa. -, 336 A2d 888 (1975).
290. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
291. 227 Pa. Super. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973).
292. In re Anderson, No. 4039 (C.P. Phila., Aug. 20, 1973).
293. Id. at 442, 313 A.2d at 261. As previously noted, the Anderson court expressly held that it was permissible to take a child to a police station rather than
directly to a detention facility as section 13(a) (3) of the Act requires. Id. See
Juvenile Act of 1972 § 13(a) (3), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310(a) (3) (Supp.
1975-76) ; text accompanying notes 276-84 supra.

294. The drafters of the Proposed Act indicated that police interrogation of a child
should not be condoned.

PROPOSED

AcT, § 13, Comment.
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ance with the constitutional principles of due process, must assuredly be declared inadmissible and, therefore, suppressed. However, it is the opinion of this court that the provisions of the new
Juvenile Act relied upon by the defense -in arguing the inadmissibility of the confession, are not a separate and supplementary set
of guidelines to be followed by the court in seeing to it -that justice
prevails in the instance of juveniles. Rather, they represent a
codification of those standards of justice and fairness, and guarantees of fundamental rights based upon pertinent constitutional
principles of due 2 process,
which already, have been enunciated in
95
existing case law.

Perhaps this view will prevail and the supreme court will determine that a child has no greater rights under the 1972 Act than if he
or she were to be tried as an adult. This result would at least provide
a measure of consistency. An argument can be made that the law
governing a child's confession should be the same no matter whether
there is eventual trial as an adult or as a juvenile. Contrariwise, it
could also be argued that the express language of the Act generally
gives greater protection to persons under 18 years of age than that
accorded adults, and that the courts should not deprive children of
these rights granted by legislation. This would give some meaning to
the language of section 21 (b) of the Act which denies admissibility to
confessions "obtained in the course of a violation of the Act. '29 6 If the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to adopt this view, it would probably
deny admissibility to confessions where the parent was not notified with
all reasonable speed, as required by section 13(a) (1) of the Act, that
.the child had been taken into custody. 9 There is a good possibility that
the court will hold any confession inadmissible per se if the parent is not
given an opportunity to confer with the child alone. This would involve
29 9
29 8
only a slight extension of the court's holdings in Jones, Roane,
and Starkes,3 0' and it is implicit in the requirement that the parent be
notified. It is less likely that the court would forbid taking a child to
a police station or place an absolute ban on the interrogation of a child.
2.

Evidence Illegally Seized or Obtained

As previously noted, section 21(b) of the 1972 Act provides that
"[e]vidence illegally seized or obtained shall not be received over
295. 227 Pa. Super. at 442, 313 A.2d at 261 quoting In re Anderson, No. 4039

at 4 (C.P. Phila., Aug. 20, 1973).
296. See text accompanying note 284 supra.
297. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-310(a) (1) (Supp. 1975-76).
298. See notes 261-62 and accompanying text supra.
299. See notes 263-66 and accompanying text supra.
300. See notes 267-68 and accompanying text 'supra.
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objection to establish the allegations made against [the child].""'
Obviously, the crucial inquiry is whether the -term "illegally" applies
both to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment and to
evidence seized in violation of the Act.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed
itself to the rights of children with respect to search and seizure, it
can be reasonably anticipated that it would find their rights to be at
least coterminous with those of adults. Following this rationale, the
word "illegal", as used in the Act, would at least apply to conduct that
would be deemed a violation of the fourth amendment rights of adults
30 2
in similar situations.
There are several issues which have peculiar application to children. One is a search by school officials of the body of the student or
of his or her possessions. Pennsylvania has recently adopted the rule
adhered to by the majority of jurisdictions30 3 that evidence obtained
by school officials is not suppressible even if the search or seizure would
have been illegal if conducted by the police.30 4 The court reasoned that
suppression is aimed at controlling police behavior and not the activities
of nonpolice persons 05 However, by utilizing the same reasoning,
evidence seized by school officials at the request of, or in the presence
of, police officers is suppressible if the search or seizure was in violation
of the child's fourth amendment rights.306
Another issue is presented by the search upon consent of the
parent, of a child's room or possessions by the police. In the case of
Commonwealth v. Hardy,0 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the consent of the parent validated the search. 08 However, the rule
may be different where the area searched is set aside exclusively for
30
the use of the child.

9

§ 50-318(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
302. See In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972).
303. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973).
304. See Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974).
In Dingfelt, a bottle of capsules obtained during a search of a student by an
assistant school principal was not suppressible.
305. See id. at 382, 323 A.2d at 146 (1974); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973);
Valente, Student Discipline in Public Schools Under the Constitution, 17 VILL. L.
301. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

REv. 1028, 1041 (1972).

306. See Commonwealth v. McClosky, 217 Pa. Super. 442, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
307. 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966).
308. Id. at 216, 223 A.2d at 723.
309. See People v. Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973) ; cf. United States
ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970). Nunn involved a
mother's authorization of a warrantless search of the quarters that the 19-year-old son
occupied in his mother's house. The Nunn court held that, since the fourth amendment protects people and not places, the evidence obtained during the search must
be excluded. 55 Ill. 2d at 347, 304 N.E.2d at 84. In Cabey, the sole key to the
defendant's garage had been taken from him upon his arrest and had been given
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Presumably, police are required to obtain a search warrant to
search a juvenile's effects if they would be required to do so for an
adult. If so, from whom do they obtain the warrant, the court or a
district justice? Do the benevolent aspects of the 1972 Act require
that a judge sitting to hear juvenile cases be the one to issue the warrant? There is no case law dealing with these issues.
To date, ,there has been no case authority dealing with searches
in violation of the Act. The language of the Act governing confessions
expressly excludes confessions obtained in violation of constitutional
guarantees and in violation of the Act. ° An example of the kind of
issues which might arise in this vein with regard to searches and seizures
is a consensual search of a child's possessions prior to notifying the
parents that their child is in custody. Is such a search "illegal" within
the meaning of the Act? As was previously noted, the impact of the
express language on confessions has not been finally resolved and the
admissibility of evidence obtained in such searches likewise remains
11

unsettled.3

3.

Identification Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has established that an adult

accused of crime has a right to counsel at a police lineup

12

and that

evidence secured at an unnecessarily suggestive lineup is suppressible." 8
While the 1972 Act does not specifically address these issues, these
principles appear to be applicable to juvenile cases. 8 14
In Kirby v. Illinois,315 -the United States Supreme Court stated a
rule which created considerable confusion for the juvenile bar. In
Kirby, the Court held that the right to counsel did not attach until
formal prosecution had commenced,8 16 but it was not clear when that
occurred in a juvenile case. In Commonwealth v. Richman,317 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the right to counsel for an adult
commences upon arrest, except for prompt on-the-scene identificato his wife. She consented to a search of the garage which revealed incriminating

evidence. Noting that there was no evidence indicating that the defendant had ever
given his wife the key before, the Cabey court held that she had no independent
right to consent to a search and that, therefore, the evidence obtained from the
search must be excluded. 431 F.2d at 843-44.
310. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 21(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b)

(Supp.

1975-76).
311. See notes 290-300 and accompanying text supra.
312. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
313. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
314. See Commonwealth v. Hodges, 218 Pa. Super. 245, 275 A.2d 884 (1971).

315. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
316. Id. at 688.
317. 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974).
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tions.3 1 8 It is likely that this rule would be applicable to a juvenile case,
thus establishing a child's right to counsel during a police identification
procedure.
E.

The Plea

The 1972 Act does not establish a procedure for entering a plea.
Generally, the phrases guilty and not guilty are not used in juvenile
practice, rather the words "admit" or "admission" and "deny" or
"denial" are substituted. The absence of established procedure and
language should not be taken, however, as an indication -that the plea is
insignificant.
If counsel concludes that an admission of a delinquent act is proper
in view of the evidence and other circumstances, this matter should be
fully discussed with the child and the child's parents. They should be
advised that the child, in making an admission, is waiving certain
rights.319 On the other hand, the child and parents should be advised
that if the evidence is strong, these rights may be of little value compared to the advantages admission may offer. Many juvenile courts
feel that an admission of culpability is the first step in a child's rehabilitation and will favorably consider this in the disposition of the child.
Plea bargaining has recently made its appearance in the juvenile area
and is an appropriate matter to discuss with the district attorney if
the client so agrees. As in the criminal law, the prosecution has a
tendency to overcharge. However, the district attorney is often willing
to drop the additional charges in order to simplify the hearing.3 20
There is yet another reason for the entry of an admission. If the
district attorney has been previously advised that there will be an
admission, often the victims of the offense will not be subpoenaed.
This can be significant since, no matter how de minimis the offense
may have been, its victims are sometimes in a mood for vengeance and
their presence can have an adverse effect on a plea bargain or on the
disposition.
If it is decided that an admission will be made, preparation for the
hearing is important. Not all judges engage in the guilty plea colloquy
attendant to adult criminal cases, 321 but the child should 'be prepared
to answer questions and understand their significance.
318. Id. at 171-72, 320 A.2d at 353.

319. Cf. A.

AMSTERDAM,

DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES

B.

§ 214

SEGAL,

& M. MILLER,

TRIAL MANUAL

FOR THE

(1967).

320. Id. at § 206 et seq.
321. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) ; PA. R.
CRIm. P. 319.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975

49

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VIOL. 21 : p. 1

Since under the Act the disposition alternatives available to the
court are somewhat limited by the verdict,3 2 2 counsel must ensure that

the record is perfectly clear as to which offenses are admitted. This is
important even if there is no plea bargain, as the judge will often be
inclined to dismiss the disputed charges at the adjudicatory hearing if
some charges are admitted.
F.

The Adjudicatory Hearing

The most significant impact of the Gault decision and the 1972
Act has been upon the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile case. While a
jury trial is not permitted,323 and there is no right to a public trial under
the Act, 324 the overall effect of Gault and the 1972 Act has been to
convert the juvenile adjudicatory hearing into a reasonably accurate
replica of an adult criminal trial.
1.

Bifurcated Hearing

A significant characteristic of American criminal procedure is the
general practice of separating the issues of criminal liability and sentence. This procedure, called bifurcation, operates to prevent the
prosecution from offering evidence concerning the character and background of the accused until after the issue of criminal liability has been
3

resolved.

25

Generally, bifurcation has not been used in American juvenile
courts. Probation reports or social studies have customarily been introduced at the adjudicatory stage, and therefore could have operated
to prejudice the juvenile court with regard to the child's alleged commission of a delinquent act. 26 However, the 1972 Act has provided for
a bifurcated hearing by the operation of two of its sections. Section
23(b) of the Act provides that, before the court can hear evidence to
determine if the child is in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or super322. See text accompanying note 433 infra.
323. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 19(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,

§ 50-316(a) (Supp.
1975-76). The United States Supreme Court has held that a jury trial in a
juvenile proceeding is not constitutionally mandated. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
324. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 19(d), PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-316(d) (Supp.
1975-76).
325. See generally Mueller & Besharov, Bifurcation: The Two Phase System
of Criminal Procedure in the United States, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 613 (1969).
326. For this and other reasons, a number of commentators have urged the use
of a bifurcated hearing in the juvenile process. See PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 35 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]; Glen, Bifurcated Hearings in the Juvenile Court, 16 CRIME & DELLNQ. 255

(1970).
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vision, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the child
27
committed the acts which gave rise to the allegations of delinquency.
Section 22(a) of the Act prohibits the preparation of a social report
prior to an admission or adjudication that the child has committed a
8 28
delinquent act.

2.

Evidence

Prior to Gault, the rules of evidence in juvenile cases were ambiguous. The district attorney rarely appeared, the witnesses were
often questioned by the court or probation officer, and defense attorneys
were 'seldom present. The therapeutic philosophy of delinquency law
led -the court to relaxation of the rules of evidence in favor of admitting
virtually all matter which assisted in accurately diagnosing the child's
needs. It was not unusual for the court to. question the child at the
adjudicatory stage, even though -the child might not wish to testify. 29
Since Gault, the presence of defense counsel and the district attorney
has led to a proceeding which more closely resembles a criminal trial,
including the application of the customary rules of evidence. Gault
established that a child has the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 0 The establishment of both of these rights has significantly affected the adjudicatory hearing.
The impact of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
is not limited to evidentiary considerations, 8 8' but the evidentiary matters are potentially present in almost every case. Prior to the Act,
hearsay in the form of probation or social reports was often admitted
in juvenile hearings. 3 2 These reports are now specifically barred by
the Act, 88 but they would otherwise be prohibited by the right to con-

front and cross-examine witnesses. 3 4 However, the status of other
hearsay evidence is not as clear. It is difficult to distinguish evidence
which is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule from evidence
327.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 11,

§ 50-320(b) (Supp. 1975-76).

328. Id. § 50-319(a).
329. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 326 at 28.

330. 387 U.S. at 55-56.
331. For example, the right to confrontation includes the right to be present at
every stage of the proceedings. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). This
principle is partially recognized by the Act in section 19(d). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 50-316(d) (Supp. 1975-76). The right to confrontation may also be involved in
lineups. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
332. See text accompanying note 326 supra.
333. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 22(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 50-319(a) (Supp.
1975-76).
334. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 21(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(a) (Supp.
1975-76).
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which is inadmissible because it violates the right to confrontation. 3 '
In Pennsylvania criminal cases, the rule has been stated thusly: "wellrecognized exceptions to ,the hearsay rule supported by circumstances
guaranteeing sufficient 'indicia of reliability' do not raise confrontation
problems.""'
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses has even been
held to exclude offending material which was not in evidence concerning
the defendant. In Bruton v. United States, 337 an extrajudicial statement of a codefendant was offered at trial, and the jury was instructed
not to consider the statement with regard to the defendant. 3 5 In
Douglas v. Alabama,3 9 a witness' prior statement was read to him
at trial, but since he refused to answer the prosecutor's questions concerning it, the statement was not admitted into evidence. In both cases,
the United States Supreme Court held that the right to confrontation
required the reversal of the convictions because of the prejudicial impact
of the statements on the jury.3 40 It is questionable whether these rulings
would apply in a nonjury context, such as a juvenile proceeding, where
the court is less likely to be swayed by inadmissible material.84 1
Moreover, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
involves the issue of the scope of cross-examination.3 4 2 In Davis v.
Alaska,34 3 the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the defendant had not been permitted to cross-examine, for impeachment purposes, a prosecution witness concerning the witness' prior
juvenile record, even though juvenile records are not generally available
for public examination. 44 It seems likely that this ruling can be applied
to juvenile cases, although prior to Davis, the Supreme Court of Penn335. See generally Griswold, The Dune Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119
U. PA. L. Rav. 711 (1971).
336. See Commonwealth v. Ransom, 446 Pa. 457, 461, 288 A.2d 762, 764 (1972),
quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Porter,
449 Pa. 153, 168, 295 A.2d 311, 320 (1972) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

337. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
338. Id. at 124-25.
339. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).

340. 391 U.S. at 126; 380 U.S. at 418-23.
341. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972). But see Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652
(1973); Commonwealth v. Fields, 231 Pa. Super. 238, 331 A.2d 494 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Rivers, 218 Pa. Super. 184, 279 A.2d 766 (1971).
342. See Juvenile Act of 1972 § 21(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(a)
(Supp. 1975-76) which expressly grants an alleged delinquent the right to crossexamine witnesses.
343. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
344. Id. at 319-21.
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sylvania held that a defense witness in a criminal case may not be crossexamined on his juvenile record.8 4 5
The privilege against self-incrimination at the adjudicatory hearing
is set out in section 21 (b) of the Act,84 6 and it is recognized by all but
47
a few juvenile judges.3
Initially, the Act appeared to have added a rule of evidence to the
juvenile law. Section 21(b) of the Act provides in part that "[a]
confession validly made by a child out of court at a time when the child
is under 18 years of age shall be insufficient to support an adjudication
of delinquency unless it is corroborated by other evidence. '8 4 However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently held that this language merely incorporates the corpus delicti rule into juvenile law.8 49
The Act offers no direct guidelines as to what extent other rules of
evidence are applicable in juvenile proceedings. Section 23(d) of the
Act provides:
In disposition hearings.., all evidence helpful in determining the
questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be
received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative
value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the
petition. 350
Does this imply that the normal criminal rules as to the competency
of evidence apply to adjudicatory hearings? The answer would be
clear had the drafters of the 1972 Act utilized the standard promulgated
by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
which requires that the finding be "based upon competent, material and
relevant evidence." '' In the absence of any legislative guidelines, judges
tend to treat evidentiary questions in juvenile proceedings in the same
manner as they are treated in nonjury adult criminal proceedings.3" 2
345. Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973).

346.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Supp. 1975-76).

347. It is the author's experience that several judges still call upon the child to
give a statement even though counsel has not called the child to testify in his or her
own defense.
348. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-318(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
349. See Anderson Appeal, 227 Pa. Super. 439, 313 A.2d 260 (1973). The
corpus delicti rule provides that a criminal conviction may not be based on an
extrajudicial confession or admission unless the confession or admission is corroborated by independent evidence establishing that a crime has been committed. See
Commonwealth v. Ware,
Pa. . 329 A.2d 258 (1974).
350. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-320(d) (Supp. 1975-76).
351. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR
DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT AcTs § 32(c) (19-).
352. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 341, § 60.
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Demurrer

The 1972 Act does not provide for a demurrer 5 8 to the evidence
at the close of the Commonwealth's case. However, the greater formality imposed on juvenile proceedings by the United States Supreme
Court and the Act make the need for the demurrer apparent. In practice,
it seems that the juvenile courts have adopted, without much comment,
the demurrer device from Pennsylvania criminal procedure.3 54
Although a demurrer will often be inappropriate for all of the
charges, it may be suitable for some of them. If this is so, it is tactically
advantageous to eliminate these charges at the demurrer stage. Occasionally the juvenile court, even though it has not sustained the demurrer, gives an indication of which parts of the Commonwealth's case
it considers to be the weakest. Counsel may then direct the presentation
of the child's defense accordingly.
4.

Defenses

Presumably all of the defenses available to an adult accused of
crime are available to the juvenile in an adjudicatory hearing, with two
possible exceptions - insanity and infancy.
With regard to the use of insanity as a defense in juvenile proceedings, the authorities are split. Some support the use of the insanity
defense in the adjudicatory stage, while others have argued that such
a defense should only be considered at disposition.'" Section 29 of the
Act3 56 requires the court to proceed under the Pennsylvania Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966... if the evidence indicates
that the child may be subject to commitment or detention under the
provisions of the latter act. However, this does not resolve the issue
of insanity as a defense when the child is not subject to commitment at
the time of the adjudicatory hearing.
Infancy as a defense in a juvenile case, raises problems similar to
those raised by insanity. Should a child's Jack of understanding be a
complete defense or merely a factor to be considered in determining the
353. Essentially, a defendant's demurrer to the Commonwealth's evidence admits
all of the facts which that evidence tends to prove and all inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom, and asserts that this evidence and these inferences together do not
constitute conduct proscribed by the applicable criminal law. If the court decides against
the demurrer, the defendant (or child in an adjudicatory hearing under the 1972
Act) may present his or her evidence and the case proceeds as if the demurrer had
not been made. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 481 (1964).
354. See Garner Appeal, 230 Pa. Super. 476, 326 A.2d 581 (1974).
355. See Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv.
659 (1970); Popkin & Lippert, Is There a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court? 10 J. FAMILY L. 421 (1971).
356. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-326 (Supp. 1975-76).
357. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101 et seq. (1969).
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proper disposition?"" It seems that in most cases the juvenile courts

avoid the theoretical issues and attempt to treat younger children in a
manner befitting their lack of maturity. This may mean treating delinquent acts under the court's deprivation jurisdiction,3 9 or the application of the court's least punitive sanctions.
5.

Verdict

In In re Winship,360 the United States Supreme Court held that in
a juvenile proceeding, where a violation of the criminal law is alleged
and there exists a possibility of institutional commitment, a finding of
guilt must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter
of due process.3 6 1 Section 23(b) of the 1972 Act adopts this standard
62
of proof for all conduct constituting delinquency.
To support an adjudication of delinquency and to bring the child
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until age 21, the former
juvenile acts in Pennsylvania required the court to find only that the
child had committed any one of the acts alleged. 63 The 1972 Act
requires the court to be more specific. Under section 26 of the Act, at
disposition, the court cannot initially commit the child for a period in
excess of 3 years, or the maximum for the offense had it been committed
by an adult, whichever period is shorter. 364 This imposes a duty upon
the juvenile court to state for the record the offense which the child is
found to have committed. The author has observed that most courts
recognize this obligation.
In addition to finding that the child committed the alleged acts,
the juvenile court must find that the child is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.368 Often judges merely make a finding of
delinquency without separately determining the need for treatment,
supervision, or rehabilitation. If this issue is considered at all, it is in
the context of the disposition hearing.
V.

DISPOSITION

A. The Social Study and Report
The individualized treatment of juveniles is an important goal of
juvenile law. The keystone of individualized treatment is the social
358. See Fox, supranote 355, at 664-74.
359. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 24, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-321
1975-76).
360. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
361. Id. at 368.
362. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-320(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
363. See, e.g., In re Redding, 184 Pa. Super. 352, 134 A.2d 689 (1957).

(Supp.

364. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-323 (Supp. 1975-76).

365. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 23(b),
1975-76).

PA. STAT. ANN. tit

11, § 50-320(b) (Supp.
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study ahd report86 which is prepared by the juvenile probation staff
of the court and is analogous to the presentence report in criminal law. 67
Prior to the 1972 Act, the social report was frequently prepared in
advance of, and considered by the juvenile court during, the adjudicatory hearing.3 6 8 Under section 22(a) of the Act, the report cannot be
prepared prior to an admission or adjudication that the child has committed a delinquent act. 0 9 The Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges
Commission has suggested eight areas of concern upon which the report
should focus:
1. The significance of the offense, or offenses which brought the
child to the attention of the juvenile court.
2. The child's behavior pattern at home, the school and in the
community.
3. The development of the child physically, intellectually, emotionally and socially with emphasis upon increasing our understanding of the child's present behavior and possible future
difficulties.
4. The attitudes of the family, school and community as they may
effect the child's chances for re-adjustment.
5. Psychological, psychiatric and medical evaluation where this
kind of help seems indicated.
6. Employers and opportunity for employment.
7. An evaluation. Based on the information developed in the
factual portion of the social study, the probation officer should
evaluate the child in terms of his adjustment potential.
8. A recommendation. The probation officer should be prepared
to recommend a disposition plan or should include this item
in the social study, if requested by the juvenile court judges.
The recommendation which is based on the facts developed in
the social 'history should be definite and should be realistic from
:the standpoint of the child, his parents and the community.8 70
366. JUVENILE COURT JUDGE'S COMMISSION, JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK 48 (Supp.
1970) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK] ; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 326, at 35.
367. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1403.
368. TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 326, at 35.
369. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-319(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
370. JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK, supra note 366, at 48. The format for the
social report in Delaware County is as follows:
1. Child's name, birth, race, religion.
2. Parent's name, birth, race, religion, marital status.
3. Same information for siblings of the parent [sic].

4. Address - child and family with whom he lives.
5. Present Complaint: name of police department and/or other agency or
individual signing petition of offense against child; description of offense,
date, child's admission or denial. Others involved: list names of others

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/1

56

Packel: A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law

1975-1976]

PENNSYLVANIA

DELINQUENCY LAW

57

The impact of the social report cannot be overemphasized, as
juvenile courts follow the report's recommendations in a substantial
majority of the cases.3 Despite the significance of the social report, it
remains a most uncertain area of juvenile law for counselY 2 How can
counsel cope with the expertise, or apparent expertise, of the probation
staff? Unfortunately, counsel often either uncritically yields to the
report or only challenges it in the courtroom. While counsel has the
right to examine and controvert reports and cross-examine the individuals who prepared the reports, 3 13 this should not be the primary
focus of counsel's efforts. Instead, the attention of counsel should be
also involved in offense and referred to the court, where this information
is significant to the court summary.
6. Previous record: with court; state briefly date, offense, disposition.
7. Family situation:
a. significant events in the family's history
b. names of employers, types of work involved and salaries earned by
parents and other members of the family. Social security or other
benefits received in case of deceased parents or unemployment. Relationships of people in the home.
8. Evaluation of the child
a. frequency of contacts with the child
b. estimate of child's ability to relate to probation officer and child's
use of casework help
c. evaluation of child's attitude towards family and willingness to use
help offered by family members and/or professional help offered, i.e.,
psychiatrist
d. where applicable [sic]: child's use of placement in the detention
center, i.e.,
1. relationship to peers
2. relationship to detention staff
3. use made of various programs conducted in detention center
9. Evaluation of parents
a. frequency of contacts with them
b. evaluation of their attitudes towards offense, child and the court
c. evaluation of their feelings about probation, the department's plan
and willingness to support plan
10. Health: general statement
11. School adjustment: name of school and grade attending as well as
statement regarding academic and social adjustment. The names and
sources of any testing done by the school should also be included.
12. Psychological and Psychiatric Studies date of testing; brief statement of
findings where pertinent to use in summary attach report.
13. Contacts with other social agencies and use made of their services.
14. Remarks and Recommendation: to be included only on court summary
submitted to the judge.
D. Robbins, The Social Study: Determinative Factor in Disposition 9-10, November
21, 1973 (unpublished thesis in Villanova University School of Law Institute of
Correctional Law).
371. See Comment, In re Gault: Understanding the Attorney's New Role, 12
VILL. L. REv. 803, 830, 838 (1967).
372. The social report does not present as great a problem in Philadelphia, since
the public defender's office has its own social service staff which can prepare reports
and make recommendations on behalf of the child.
373. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 23(d), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-320(d) (Supp.
1975-76).
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directed to the preparation of the report. Since juvenile courts most
often follow the recommendation of the probation officer, he or she
becomes the finder of fact with respect to disposition, and counsel's
advocacy must therefore be directed toward persuading the probation
officer to find in favor of the client.
The importance of the reports should be explained to the child and
the child's family, and they should be forcefully encouraged to cooperate
with the probation officer.
If at all possible, counsel should accompany the child and parents
to the probation office for at least the first visit. Counsel should also be
cooperative and clearly state that he or she will be available to the
probation officer for consultation should any such need arise.
Furthermore, counsel should take steps to supply as much of the
information needed for the report as possible. If the child is employed,
the employer should be contacted and advised of a possible future contact by the probation officer. If the employer has something favorable
to say about the child, a letter should be obtained, and the original, or
a copy, given -to the probation officer. Clergymen, neighbors, workers
for youth groups or -training programs and other people who know the
child should also be similarly contacted. The child should be asked for
the names of teachers who may give favorable impressions, and letters
should be obtained from them, or the probation officer should be requested to confer with them.
Counsel should advise the child to join and participate in youth
groups, training programs, drug programs and the like, and should
ensure that such participation is mentioned in the report. If there is a
possibility of a recommendation of commitment, counsel should work
with the probation officer to examine alternatives to commitment. If
commitment is inevitable, counsel should explore with the probation
officer the possibility of commitment to the institution which is the most
desirable from -the child's viewpoint.
Both section 23(d) 3 7 4 and section 37(2)... of the 1972 Act permit
counsel to examine the social report except for confidential sources.
While neither section establishes when the report may be seen, counsel
should attempt to examine the report prior to the disposition hearing
since this allows counsel to supply correct information, should the
report contain erroneous data, before the report is relied upon. If the
information is not adequately substantiated, the probation officer can
be requested to make a further investigation. If the child or the child's
family has given counsel information which conflicts with the report,
374. Id.
375. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-334(2)
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an examination of the report prior to the disposition hearing will enable
counsel to avoid embarrassment to the child, and to counsel, during the
hearing. Counsel will also be better able to determine whether it will
be necessary to call witnesses and to determine which areas will be
focused upon at the hearing. In addition, counsel will be able to prepare
the child and family for the recommended disposition.
B.

Need for Treatment, Supervision or Rehabilitation

If the juvenile court finds that the child committed a delinquent
act, it must hear evidence to determine whether the child needs treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. Section 23(b) of the Act provides
that "[i]f the court finds that the child is not%in need of treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceeding and discharge the child from any detention or other restriction theretofore
ordered." 7 6
Even prior to the statutory mandate for this practice, juvenile
courts exercised their inherent authority to dismiss cases in situations
where the charges had been proven. 77 Additionally, some juvenile
courts utilized a continuance procedure whereby. the child was placed
under supervision upon a finding that he or she had committed a delinquent act. If the child responded well to the program of supervision,
the charges were dismissed., 8 The Philadelphia juvenile courts have
"determined" cases for years. This phrase, although nowhere defined,
is used to indicate the situation in which a case is terminated without
a disposition of the child. 7 9 In effect, the Act's requirement of a finding
of need for treatment, supervision or -rehabilitation is merely a statutory
adaptation of the informal practice which formerly existed in the
juvenile system.
Not all juvenile courts follow the mandate of section 23(b) of
the 1972 Act. Several courts enter adjudications of delinquency based
solely upon a finding that the child has committed a delinquent act.
But, if a court decides to comply with the Act, it must decide what test
to apply in determining if there exists a need for; treatment, supervision
or rehabilitation. Initially, the 1972 Act does not expressly allocate
376. Id. § 50-320(b). This procedure is unique to the juvenile law. In a
criminal proceeding the court generally will sentence after there has been a finding
of guilt. While juries and judges sitting without juries 'do acquit in some cases

where the prosecution has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this practice is
relatively rare.
377. See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm. L.
REV. 281, 290 (1967).
378. Id. at 292.
379. Klein, A Practical Look at the New Juvenile Act, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv.
186, 207 (1973).
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the burden of proof on this issue. Must the Commonwealth show a
need, or must the child prove a lack of need? Section 23(b) of the
Act provides: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence
of the commission of acts which constitute a felony shall be sufficient
to sustain a finding that the child is in need of treatment, supervision
or rehabilitation. 3'8 ° This language can be read as creating an inference or presumption of a need for treatment, supervision or rehabilitation. However, if the child is found to have engaged in conduct constituting only a misdemeanor, the juvenile court obviously will not be
aided by this presumption or inference. Assuming that the Commonwealth has the burden' of proof, there remains the question of which
standard to apply: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convinc81
ing evidence, a preponderance of the evidence, or some other standard.
In the absence of express guidelines for these questions, the requirement of a finding of a need for treatment, supervision or rehabilitation is a dead letter. Juvenile courts will still dismiss or "determine"
a case if they feel it is-too insignificant to merit the court's attention, or
they will use a consent decree 8 2 if they feel that the child needs some
form of supervision but does not require an adjudication of delinquency.
It is unlikely that the juvenile courts will change their practice unless
and until the appellate courts or the Pennsylvania legislature provide a
8
clearer mandate and more definite guidelines.
C. Evidence
The rules of evidence have a different application in the disposition
hearing than they do in the adjudicatory hearing. Section 23(d) of
the 1972 Act provides that "all evidence helpful in determining the
questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value
even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition." '
This provision permits the juvenile court to consider the social report
380. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-320(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
381. Section 29(c) of the Uniform Act requires clear and convincing evidence.
382. See text accompanying notes 389-93 infra.
383. It is possible that the recent case of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 95 S. Ct. 1881
(1975), will provide the impetus. In Mullaney, the United States Supreme Court
held that when a state law provided that "heat of passion" would reduce a murder
charge to manslaughter, the prosecution was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the homicide did not occur in the "heat of passion" when the issue was
properly raised. Id. at 1892. The rationale was that "heat of passion" was an element of the offense, and that due process required that all elements of an offense be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Id. at 1888-91. It could be
argued that the need for treatment, supervision or rehabilitation is likewise an element
of the "offense" of delinquency, and therefore, must be proven by the Commonwealth
beyond a reasonable doubt.
384. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-320(d) (Supp. 1975-76).
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and psychiatric or psychological reports. Although there -is a right
under the Act to controvert the report and cross-examine the individual
who made the report,"8 5 this right may be meaningless if the maker of
the report, as is usually the case, obtained the information contained
therein from another person. For example, the probation officer may
obtain information from school officials, and it would, therefore, be of
little aid to cross-examine the probation officer to ascertain the accuracy of the school records. It is far more helpful to assess the accuracy
of such information prior to the disposition hearing. Generally, the
psychologist or psychiatrist who examines a child will not be present
at the hearing and these types of reports are admissible under section
86
23 (d) of the Act.3

Although reports prepared by, or at the request of, the probation
officer are admissible in evidence, reports and letters prepared on behalf
of the child are not generally offered as a matter of practice. However,
there appears no reason why such material would not be accepted in
evidence under the provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, whenever it is
possible, this type of evidence should be accompanied by the live testimony of its author. A live witness will almost always be more persuasive
than an impersonal report, and oftentimes judges are favorably impressed by the fact that a witness took the time to appear.
D. Possible Disposition
Sections 24387 and 25388 of the 1972 Act list possible forms of
disposition. However, the range of alternatives available for disposition
is not limited by these sections. If the goal of disposition is individualized treatment for children, then it is desirable to have the widest possible range of alternatives, and the probation 'officer, counsel, and
juvenile court should not hesitate to be creative in order to best satisfy
the needs of the child.
1.

Consent Decree

The consent decree as set out in section 8.1 of the Act, 8 ' is a
device for placing an allegedly delinquent child under the supervision
of the probation department prior to, and as an alternative to, adjudi385. Id.

386. Id.
387. Id. § 50-321.
388. Id. § 50-322.
389. Id. § 50-305. Its placement in the 1972 Act gives no indication that the
type of disposition. However, for all practical purposes, it is a
type of disposition alternative, although it usually precedes and precludes an adjudication of delinquency.

consent decree is a

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975

61

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21 : p. 1

cation, thus avoiding the potential stigma attached to an adjudication
of delinquency."' 0
While the consent decree is analogous to the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition provision in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 9 ' the provisions of the 1972 Act are not as carefully developed, and thus leave greater potential and need for appellate resolu09
tion of a number of issues.

2

While section 8.1(a) of the Act provides that agreement of the
district attorney is not mandatory, 3 ' it is always advisable to discuss
a proposed consent decree with that office when possible. Some juvenile
courts accord considerable weight to a district attorney's refusal to
agree, and the author has observed that almost all juvenile courts will
grant a consent decree when it is proposed or approved by the district
attorney.
A number of counties in Pennsylvania have adopted specific criteria
to determine a child's eligibility for a consent decree. One widely established criterion is that the child not have any prior adjudications or
consent decrees. This criterion is relatively flexible, however, particularly if the case under consideration involves relatively inoffensive conduct, or if the prior case occurred several years before.
390. There was no provision for a consent decree in the Uniform Act, the Proposed
Act, or Pennsylvania's earlier juvenile acts. However, prior to the 1972 Act, it was not
unusual for a juvenile court to place a child under supervision for a specified period,
and to dismiss the charges if the child performed satisfactorily under supervision.
See Note, supra note 372, at 292. Section 8.1 was apparently derived from a statutory
model prepared by the federal government. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-305
(Supp. 1975-76) with U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE FOR DRAFTING

FAMILY AND JUVENILE

COURT ACTS

§ 33 (1969).

391. PA. R. CRIM P. 175 et seq.
392. The following are examples of questions left unanswered by the 1972 Act:
Does a child waive the statute of limitations or the right to a speedy trial by accepting
a consent decree? Rule 178(3) requires a waiver of these rights in the criminal
context. PA. R. CRIM. P. 178(3). What is the effect, if any, of a consent decree if
the petition is reinstated as the result of the filing of a new petition, or as a result
of the violation of the terms of the consent decree as provided in section 8.1(b) of
the Act? Does the reinstated petition require a trial de novo of the charges contained
therein, or does the child's agreement to the consent decree serve as an admission
to those charges? Rule 184(c) requires a trial de novo in the criminal context. PA.
R. CRIM. P. 184(c). If there must be a trial de novo, may the statements the child
made during the consent decree hearing be used at this trial? Rule 179(b) prohibits
such use of statements made in the A.R.D. hearing. PA. R. CRrM. P. 179(b). May the
testimony of the witnesses appearing at the consent decree hearing be read into the
record at the subsequent trial, or must the witnesses appear again? Is the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule applicable as to these witnesses' testimony at the
consent decree hearing? Finally, the 1972 Act authorizes the district attorney, with the
consultation of the probation department of the court, to reinstate a petition. Should
judicial approval be required? Rule 184 requires judicial approval in the criminal
context. PA. R. CRIMI. P.184.
393, PA.

STAT.

ANN. tit. 11, § 50-305(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
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Restitution

It is unclear whether a juvenile court has the power to require a
delinquent child to make restitution to the victim or victims of the
delinquent act, because the Pennsylvania legislation which creates this
type of liability for the parents of a delinquent child expressly preserves
the child's common law liability, and is otherwise silent. 394 The few
cases which have considered the power of the court in this regard seem
to indicate that restitution may be ordered if it is imposed "wholly in
the interest of the child, looking toward his reformation and not to
'
Despite this
make good the damages flowing from his -illegal act." 395
legal uncertainty, some juvenile courts routinely impose restitution, and
counsel rarely resists such an order. Restitution as a rehabilitative
device, if not unreasonably imposed, offers one distinct advantage in
that it forcefully emphasizes to the child the personal nature of the
harm caused by his or her conduct. However, the restitution device
can be abused; if the amount is excessive, or if the child or child's
family will be subjected to undue threats should they fail to make
restitution, the resentment created is likely to neutralize any rehabilitative value.
In an appropriate case, counsel should not hesitate to discuss the
possibility of restitution with the child and the child's family and subsequently to propose it to the juvenile court. Often the court will be
inclined to avoid committing the child if it is persuaded that both the
child and the victim of the delinquent conduct will benefit by an order of
restitution and the placement of the child on probation.
3.

Fines

Fines, like restitution, are not mentioned by the 1972 Act as a
possible disposition, but, unlike restitution, they are rarely imposed in
practice. There is authority supporting the proposition that a fine may
not be imposed in a juvenile case,' 9 6 the theory being that the imposition
of a fine would transform the matter into a criminal case. 97 However,
the juvenile court does have the power to enforce a fine imposed by the
minor judiciary for a child's summary offense. 398 Hence, an argument
could be made that the court similarly has the authority to impose a fine
394. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2005 (Supp. 1975-76).
395.
Weiner
396.
Cramer
397.

Trignami's Case, 148 Pa. Super. 142, 145, 24 A.2d 743, 744 (1942). See
Appeal, 176 Pa. Super. 255, 106 A.2d 915 (1954).
See Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908)
v. Wise, 501 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1974).
Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 326, 115 N.W. 682, 686

(1908).
398. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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in a juvenile case, especially when the fine is imposed not to punish,
but 'to encourage the child's reformation. 99
4.

Probation

Probation is the primary device utilized by the juvenile court to
achieve the goal of individualized treatment for delinquent children.
In criminal law, probation can be defined as the suspension of sentence
accompanied by the release of the offender subject to certain enumerated
conditions. 00 While in juvenile law there exists no sentence to be
suspended, there does exist a possibility of commitment, and for this
reason, juvenile probation can be analogized to adult probation.
Aside from the relatively insignificant provisions of sections 4401
and 25(2) 402 the 1972 Act is silent on probation, and in several areas,
this silence presents serious problems. For example, the issue arises as
to the maximum permissible length of the probationary period. For an
adult offender in Pennsylvania, probation may be imposed up to the
maximum period of the sentence which could have been imposed upon
conviction. 0 3 Whether this principle applies to children, and whether
the length of probation is limited by section 26 of the Act 40 4 to the
lesser of 3 years or the maximum which could have been imposed upon
an adult are open questions. Further, the question may be posed if
section 26 is applicable, may the juvenile court extend the probationary
period as is permitted when a child is committed. Under the prior
Pennsylvania juvenile acts, probation lasted until the child reached 21
years of age unless the court terminated probation earlier.40 5
Section 25(2) of the Act authorizes the imposition of conditions
and limitations on probation but does not indicate their permissible
substance.40 6 Typical conditions which might be imposed include periodic reporting to the probation officer,40 1 keeping the officer informed
of whereabouts, 40 ' attending school,40 9 obtaining and keeping employment, 410 abstaining from use or abuse of intoxicants, 41 ' abstaining from
399. See ABC Juvenile, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 424 (1971).
400. See 10A P.L.E. CriminalLaw § 825 (1970).
401. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-201 (Supp. 1975-76).
402. Id. § 50-322(2).
403. Id. tit. 19, § 1056 (1964); id. tit. 61, § 331.25 (1964).
404. Id. tit. 11, § 50-323.
405. Act of June 3, 1933, art. IV, § 411, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972);
Act of June 2, 1933, § 12, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
406. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322(2) (Supp. 1975-76).
407. See D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 242
(1969).

408. Id. at 244.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 249.
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use of narcotics, 4 12 keeping reasonable hours 413 or obeying curfew laws,
414
and not violating the
avoiding disreputable places or associates,
tailored for the
conditions
special
situations,
certain
In
laws.
criminal
individual child may be imposed. These include paying costs and fines
or making restitution,41 participating in drug or alcohol abuse programs, obtaining medical or psychiatric care, 416 attending religious
serivces, 417 and living with a particular person other than the child's
parent. Ideally, the imposition of appropriate conditions for each child
should be an effective device for furthering that child's rehabilitation,
but practical, statutory, and constitutional problems are raised by the
imposition of certain conditions. For example, the imposition of a fine
or restitution as a condition of probation is arguably subject to the
same limitations as when it is imposed as a direct form of disposition. 418
A requirement of church attendance may violate first amendment rights,
as may some restrictions on speech or association. 419 Probation conditions which are unduly vague or indefinite may also be subject to
constitutional attack. 2 °
When a violation of probation is alleged, the juvenile court may
order that the child be taken into custody and detained.4 2' The 1972
Act also authorizes the probation officer to take a child into custody
when there exists reasonable cause to believe that the child has violated
4 22
the conditions of probation.
The Act fails to provide for a procedure to determine whether the
terms of probation have been violated. Arguably, a child charged with
violation of probation should be afforded the same rights of procedural
due process as is required for persons charged with violation of criminal
probation,4 23 which presumably includes the right to counsel. 4 4 It is
412. Id.
413. Id. at 250.
414. Id.
415. See text accompanying notes 394-99 supra.
416. D. DRESSLER, supra note 407, at 247.
417. Id. at 253.
418. See text accompanying notes 394-99 supra.
419. See Comment, Juvenile Probation: Restrictions, Rights and Rehabilitation,
16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 276, 283 (1971).
420. Id. at 287. One commentator has stated:
If probation can be revoked for behavior which the probationer did not even
know was prohibited, probation can hardly have a rehabilitative effect. Moreover,
due process would seem to demand a modicum of specificity, giving the offender
notice of the standards required of him;
Id. (footnotes omitted).
421. Juvenile Act of 1972 § 4(a)(5), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-201(a)(5)
(Supp. 1975-76).
422. Id.
423. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) ; Gillard v. Cook, __ Tenn.
__ 528 S.W.2d 545 (1975).
424. See text accompanying notes 216-29 supra; Gillard v. Cook, ___ Tenn.
528 S.W.2d 545 (1975).
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likely that there exists a right to a detention hearing within 72 hours
if the child is detained. 2 However, there are several equally serious
issues which are as yet unresolved: Whether a petition charging a violation of probation must be filed? Whether a violation must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether some other standard should be
applied ?1 26 What type of disposition may -the juvenile court fashion
upon finding a violation?
Counsel often may believe that placing a child on probation terminates the need for the attorney-client relationship. However, it is
submitted that a child will benefit considerably from the time spent by
counsel in explaining the conditions of probation and the possible consequences of a violation.
5.

Transfer of Custody

The juvenile court may transfer custody of a delinquent child to a
qualified person, agency, or private organization.42 7 Most frequently,
transfers of custody are made to the relatives of the child. These transfers are often a condition of probation and are usually consensual, at
least in the sense that the parents -are willing to divest themselves of
their legal right to custody of the child, or are willing to give up custody
in order to avoid having the child committed. If the consent of the
parent and child can be obtained, transfer of custody can be a useful
device for removing a child from a community or emotional situation
with which he or she cannot cope.
6.

Group Homes

There has been a recent increase in -the number of group home
facilities and day treatment facilities. Such facilities provide an alternative to commitment for children who do not present a danger to the
community but who cannot, for one reason or another, adjust to their
family homes. Such programs are often sponsored by religious organizations, or by community groups like the Y.M.C.A.
7.

Mental Health Commitment

In appropriate circumstances, commitment of the child to a mental
health institution is a possible disposition alternative under section 29
4
of the Act.

28

425. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra.
426. In Gillard v. Cook,
Term ........ 528 S.W.2d 545 (1975), the Tennessee
Supreme Court required that the violation by a juvenile of his conditions of probation be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at _, 528 S.W.2d at 548-49.
427. Juvenile Act of 1972 §§ 24(a) (2), 25(1), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 50-321(a) (2), 322(1) (Supp. 1975-76).
428. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-326 (Supp. 1975-76).
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Commitment

The 1972 Act has substantially changed the prior Pennsylvania
law governing juvenile commitments. Under the earlier law commitments could extend until the child was 21 years of age,4 29 even though
such a commitment in certain situations would institutionalize the
child for a longer term than could have been imposed had the same
offense been committed by an adult. This was characteristic of most
state juvenile statutes and was one of the factors which was of great
concern to the United States Supreme Court in Gault although the
Court did not address this problem specifically therein.430 In In re
Wilson," 1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cast doubt upon this
early law of juvenile commitment. In Wilson a 16-year-old defendant,
after he had admitted engaging in assault and battery, was declared a
delinquent and committed for 5 years to Camp Hill, an institution for
delinquents and young adult offenders. If he had been an adult, he
could have only been sentenced to a maximum of 4 years. The Wilson
court held that the imposition of a commitment longer than that which
could have been imposed on an adult sentenced for the same conduct
to the same institution was invalid as a denial of equal protection, unless
it was clear that the longer commitment would result in the juvenile's
receiving appropriate rehabilitative care. 48 2 The decision, in effect,
limited a juvenile commitment to the maximum sentence which could
be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.
Section 26 of the Act provides that commitment may not initially
be for more than 3 years, or the maximum for the offense had it been
committed by an adult, whichever is less.4 83 This represents a com-

promise between the Uniform Act, which provided for a 2-year maximum, 4 4 and the practical effect of the Wilson decision. Section 26
permits the initial commitment to be extended, 43 5 but since this provision has been infrequently used, if used at all, it remains to be seen
whether it actually can be applied. The statutory limit upon the length
of commitment is likely to be challenged in situations involving the
commitment of a child charged with ungovernability under section
429. Act of June 3, 1933, No. 312, art. IV, § 411, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972); Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, § 12, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed

1972). The theory supporting this confinement until age 21 was that upon a finding
of delinquency, the child became a ward of the institution and court until he or she
reached majority. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
430. 387 U.S. at 29.
431. 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
432. Id. at 431, 264 A.2d at 617.
433. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-323 (Supp. 1975-76).
434. UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT § 36.

435. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-323 (Supp. 1975-76).
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2(2) (ii) of the Act,43 6 since ungovernability is not an adult offense.
Thus the interesting issue is raised of whether a child can be committed
at all for ungovernability since an adult could not be convicted at all
for this offense.
Can the juvenile court commit a child for a period which is both
less than the maximum imposable upon an adult and less than 3 years?
For example, could the court commit a child for burglary for 1 year?
The author is not aware of any juvenile court doing so, but there is
nothing prohibiting the court from so doing.
One of the most appealing aspects of the 1972 Act is the requirement of biannual reviews and annual disposition hearings for committed children.4" 7 These provisions were designed, and will operate, to
prevent committed children from becoming victims of bureaucratic oversight. Although this requirement will force some of the busier juvenile
courts to undertake an increased burden, it will also compel those courts
to become more aware of the children and the operation of the institutions to which they are committed.
Can the juvenile court order the release of a committed child subsequent to a biannual review or annual disposition hearing? Although
the 1972 Act does not expressly grant the court the authority to make
such an order, such authority is assumed, as there would otherwise
be no reason to conduct these inquiries.43 8 Can a court release a child
or modify its commitment order at any time other than the 6 month or
1 year anniversary? This was authorized by the 1933 Act.43 9
The 1972 Act does not expressly require that the district attorney
be given notice of a proceeding to modify the juvenile court's order.
However, under the 1933 Act the district attorney had a right to notice
of and to appear at such a proceeding, 44° and a right to contest and to
appeal 441 an order releasing a child. It would seem that the same rights
exist under the present law, and therefore, the district attorney should
be notified of any action to be taken 'by the court with respect to modifying the child's disposition.
436. Id. § 50-102(2) (ii).

437. Juvenile Act of 1972
1975-76).

§ 26,

PA.

STAT.

ANN.

tit. 11, § 50-323 (Supp.

438. The 1933 Act expressly permitted such a release of the child. See Act of
June 3, 1933, art. IV, § 415, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972); Act of June
2, 1933, § 16, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
439. Act of June 3, 1933, art. IV, § 415 [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972);
Act of June 2, 1933, § 16, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
440. Act of June 3, 1933, art. IV, § 415, [1933] Pa. Laws 1449 (repealed 1972)
Act of June 2, 1933, § 16, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
441. See In re Miller, 209 Pa. Super. 47, 224 A.2d 89 (1966).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss1/1

68

Packel: A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law

1975-1976]

PENNSYLVANIA DELINQUENCY LAW

Section 25 of the 1972 Act specifies the institutions to which a
child may be committed. 42 More specifically, section 25(4) permits
commitment to a special facility for children operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Justice. 43 Prior to the 1972 Act, delinquent males
were, on occasion, committed to the State Correctional Institution at
Camp Hill, and delinquent females to the State Correctional Institution
at Muncy. Both of these institutions also house adult offenders. Since
the adoption of the 1972 Act, commitments to these institutions have
been tested in the courts under section 27 of the Act which prohibits
the commitment of a child to an institution which is used primarily for
the execution of adult criminal sentences except when no other appropriate facility exists.444 In the case of Commonwealth ex rel. Patton v.
Parker445 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that commitment of
delinquent males to Camp Hill was lawful provided that the delinquents
were kept apart from adult offenders at all times as is required by
section 27 of the 1972 Act. 446 In the case of In re Haas4

1

the Penn-

sylvania Superior Court held that commitment of female delinquents to
Muncy was not lawful. The court distinguished this case from Parker
on the ground that the situation at Camp Hill differed from that at
Muncy in three aspects: 1) there was no other suitable facility available
for male juveniles, 2) the joint use with adult offenders at Camp Hill
was an "interim measure," and 3) at Camp Hill the juvenile inmates
could be kept separate from the adult inmates, and still "receive a full
recreational, academic, and vocational rehabilitative program."''
There is authority supporting the proposition that committing
juveniles to adult institutions violates their due process rights since,
although they are punished as adults, they are denied the rights to
which they would be entitled if they were tried as adults.4 4 9 However,
this is a minority position and the weight of authority is currently to
the contrary.4 50 Another matter of potentially great impact on juvenile
442.
443.
444.
445.

PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 11, § 50-322 (Supp. 1975-76).
Id. § 50-322 (4).
Id.§ 50-324.
225 Pa. Super. 217, 310 A.2d 414 (1973).

446. Id. at 221, 310 A.2d at 416. However, on April 14, 1975, Pennsylvania

Attorney General Kane advised Ernest S. Patton, Superintendent of the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill that in his opinion commitment of juveniles
to Camp Hill was not lawful and that the Department of Justice would resist all
commitments to Camp Hill after August 15, 1975. The effect of this action on the
issues raised herein is difficult to predict.
447. 234 Pa. Super. 422, 339 A.2d 98 (1975).
448. Id. at 428, 339 A.2d at 101.
449. See Rice v. Cory, 73 Misc. 2d 813, 815, 342 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (1973) ; In re
F, 69 Misc. 2d 932, 934, 331 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (1971).
450. See United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973); In re O.H., 14 CraM. L. RP'R. 2346 (Mo. Ct.
App. Dec. 31, 1973).
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commitments is the argument that children may not merely be committed, but must receive rehabilitative treatment. This right-to-treatment argument has met with some success in other jurisdictions, either
as a result of statutory construction, or interpretation of the eighth or
451
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Certain situations arise where commitment is inevitable. Unlike a
criminal case where the options for commitment are limited to the
county prison or to a state correctional institution, the juvenile commitment options are wide-ranging. The Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare recently listed 24 separate institutions which receive delinquent
children. 4 2 They include state and county operated facilities and private institutions. They vary considerably in terms of treatment and
educational opportunity, and in their resemblance to jails or boarding
schools. Counsel cannot hope to become familiar with each of the
institutions but nevertheless should discuss them with the probation
officer. Attempts to contact the institutions and plan a satisfactory
arrangement for the child will be well worth counsel's effort.
VI.

POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND APPEAL

Prior to Gault, the informal procedure and absence of counsel
minimized the significance of post-trial and appellate procedures. The
1933 Act's provisions for rehearing and appeal are illustrative of the
informality of most juvenile hearings under prior law. 45 3 The 1933 Act
permitted a petition for rehearing within 21 days after an order committing the child.454 A rehearing was mandatory if the child was committed or placed in an institution or home, and discretionary if the
child was placed on probation.45 5 The testimony taken at the rehearing
was required to be transcribed. Appeal followed the rehearing.
While the 1972 Act repealed the prior law, it does not provide for
post-trial motions or appeal. In the absence of rules or rulings to the
contrary, the courts are following the practice governing criminal
cases. 456 In criminal practice a post-trial motion for new trial or in
arrest of judgment must be timely filed with the trial court in order to
preserve the defendant's right to appeal.45 ' Issues not presented in
451. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) ; Morales v. Turman, 383
F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) ; Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
452. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare Office of Children and Youth Bureau
of Youth Services, Directory of Juvenile Institutions (unpublished list on file at the
Villanova Law Review).
453. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, [1933] Pa. Laws 1433.
454. Id. § 15.
455. Commonwealth v. Croft, 445 Pa. 579, 285 A.2d 118 (1971).
456. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123.
457. Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 296 A.2d 741 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Grillo, 208 Pa. Super. 444, 222 A.2d 427 (1966).
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these motions are deemed to be waived for purposes of appeal. It is
possible that the appellate courts will apply these doctrines to juvenile
cases, although there are obvious problems involved in applying the
concept of waiver of appeal rights to cases involving children, particularly since few judges advise children of their right to appeal as
they must for adults.""
Appeals presumably are governed by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 (Appellate Court Act). 45 9 Section 302460 of the
Appellate Court Act provides that the superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of common pleas courts
unless otherwise provided. Since there is no other provision, the
superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in juvenile cases.
Section 502461 of the Appellate Court Act requires that an appeal be
filed within 30 days of the entry of the order in the case. The definition
of the word "order" may present some complications for juvenile practice. Section 102(6)462 of the Appellate Court Act defines "order" to
include, "judgment, decision, decree, sentence and adjudication." Taken
literally, this language means that an appeal must be taken from the
adjudication of delinquency rather than from the disposition.
In criminal practice appeal is taken after the sentence rather than
after the verdict.468 This author hopes that the courts will not follow a
literal interpretation of the Appellate Court Act but that they will
instead follow the criminal practice and require that an appeal be taken
from disposition rather than from adjudication.
458. PA. R. CRiM. P. 1123 (c).
459. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.101 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
460. Id. § 211.302.

461. Id. § 211.502.

462. Id. § 211.102(6).
463. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123, Comment.
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